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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
TEACHINGS ON SUICIDE
FR. ROBERT BARRY, O.P.*
INTRODUCTION
The French positivist philosopher Auguste Comte claimed
that the eternal glory of Catholicism was that it did not permit
suicide for any reason.' Comte's observation proves accurate, for
the only other world religion that protested suicide as vigorously
and effectively as Catholicism was Islam. Catholic teachings on
suicide, however, did not develop in a vacuum; they emerged
from the long traditions of the Old Testament in which suicide
was treated in many different ways.
In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion
about the morality of assisted suicide, and this has been the cause
of great concern for many. As a Roman Catholic, I have moral
and jurisprudential concerns about endorsing assisted suicide,
and I believe it is immoral as it involves deliberate killing of inno-
cent nonaggressors. I am also concerned about the administra-
tion of a policy that supports assisted suicide because I believe
such a policy is detrimental to the poor, vulnerable, marginal-
ized, and politically powerless. Finally, I am concerned that mor-
ally and legally endorsing assisted suicide would be contrary to
the basic aims and objectives of the legal and medical
professions.
In what follows, I would like to trace briefly the history of
suicide to show how the Roman Catholic position developed and
to facilitate understanding of both the historical foundations of
this position and the contemporary assisted suicide movement.
This survey will show that suicide was a common and intractable
problem in ancient society, and that the only western society to
become substantially free from suicide was medieval Christian
society. Suicide reemerged in the Renaissance, as well as the
Rationalist and Romantic eras, and is now one of the great
unresolved issues in western, secular, liberal society.
* Newman Professor of Religious Studies, University of Illinois,
Champaign-Urbana.
1. 3 AUGUSTE CoMTE, A SYSTEM OF PosrrrW POLITY 381 (1968).
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I. THE SCRIPTURAL FOUNDATION OF THE CATHOLIC TEACHINGS
ON SUICIDE
A. The Old Testament
The Scriptural foundation for the Catholic teaching against
suicide is found in Genesis, which prohibited the shedding of
innocent human blood. Genesis forbade the shedding of blood
by anyone, although it did not explicitly exclude reflexively lethal
acts: "He who sheds man's blood, shall have his blood shed by
man, for in the image of God man was made."2 This prohibition
was carried rather far in ancient Israel, for the Israelites would
execute by stoning to avoid shedding blood. The fundamental
reason for this was that innocent human life was not to be
destroyed because it was made in the image of God, but some
discount this principle. Exodus condemned killing of the inno-
cent "The innocent and just person you shall not put to death."3
The Old Testament saw death as a tragic condition because
it condemned the person to the darkness of Sheol, where they
experienced mere existence and little else. This tradition inter-
prets the Genesis creation story to mean that humanity was not
created to die, but that death came as a result of the primeval
offense of Adam and Eve, a view reaffirmed in Ecclesiasticus.4
There was a proper dread of death, which was not seen as trivial
or frivolous, and Psalms expressed hope that Yahweh would
deliver from it.5 Some, such as Koheleth, expressed an extremely
pessimistic view of death: "Indeed, the fate of man and beast is
identical; one dies, the other too, and both have the selfsame
breath; man has no advantage over the beast, for all is vanity."6
Yet despite this bleak outlook, he still taught that "there is
neither achievement, nor planning, nor knowledge, nor wisdom
in Sheol where you are going,"7 and after telling his readers that
"a live dog is better than a dead lion" he reminded them that he
who is living has "hope."8 Consciousness and our awareness of
our dying were the foundations of the human person's majesty,
and the nobility of the dying person lay in the fact that he was
aware he was dying. "The living know they will at least die, the






7. Id. at 9:10.
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9. Id. at 9:5.
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a long and happy life lived securely in Israel, which took place in
the midst of one's family with the fullness of powers still intact.1"
The opposite was a long and slow death after a long illness
because it embittered the individual."
Margaret Battin, one of the leading advocates of rational sui-
cide, sought to show that the Bible not only tolerated self-killing
but also positively encouraged it, 2 but a close examination of
suicide in the Bible does not confirm this view. The view that
God commanded his faithful to kill themselves, even to show
obedience to him, is controversial, and in only a few instances
was suicide anything but the lot of those who had abandoned or
rebelled against God. Despite Professor Battin's claims, a closer
reading shows that the Biblical materials strongly support the
prohibition of suicide rather than undermine it.
Battin asserts that the prohibition of the Decalogue does not
include suicide. 3 But Genesis forbade the shedding of blood by
anyone, and did not explicitly exclude reflexively lethal acts: "He
who sheds man's blood, shall have his blood shed by man, for in
the image of God man was made."14 This injunction was pur-
posely general, for it condemned the shedding of blood, be it
one's own or that of another. The only instances in which the
Bible allowed killing were for either self-defense or the punish-
ment of an individual for a clear, certain, and serious breach of
the law.
Professor Battin regards the condemnation of killing of the
innocent found in Exodus15 as only applying to homicide. How-
ever, this law has usually been understood to mean that no one
should be killed who does not deserve to die, including oneself.
Relative to modern law and morality, the primitive Israelite law
on killing was crude and inarticulate, and by itself, it could not
stand as an adequate moral norm for us today.' 6 Early Israelite
10. See generally Genesis 25:8.
11. See generally Job 21.
12. MARGARET P. BATTIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 28-35 (1995).
13. Id. at 28.
14. Genesis 9:6.
15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. In primitive Israelite law, the avenger, or go'el was required to avenge
injury, harm, or death upon the one who appointed him. This primitive law
was instituted to protect whole groups who could be destroyed if anyone
thought the revenge meted out to them was unjust. This primitive law
permitted relatives to avenge an injury or harm done and it forbade killing to
gain revenge, and one who intentionally killed another was to be handed over
to the avenger by the city fathers. It distinguished accidental killing from
deliberate homicide, and it allowed accidental killers to spare themselves by
fleeing to a city of refuge so long as they did not return.
1995]
452 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
laws held that guilt should be presumed if there was known
enmity between the killer and victim. 7 Just as we would hold
that its teaching that adulterers should be stoned is crude, cruel,
and ineffective, so also would we regard its precepts on killing as
not fully developed or articulated. The important point is that
these laws were correct in condemning these actions as immoral,
but the punishments to be meted out for them were unduly
harsh because of the roughness and insensitivity of the Israelites
at the time. The Decalogue condemned willful killing of the
innocent, but this judgment was not as refined as it could be.
And even though the Decalogue clearly prohibited destroying
innocent human life, it did not precisely define the object of the
culpably lethal action.
To understand the Old Testament view of suicide, it is
important to note that that book contained often rudimentary
and not fully developed moral teachings on issues. But just
because these teachings were not fully explicit, literal, and formal
does not mean that the Old Testament expressed no moral judg-
ments on them. In the Old Testament, moral judgments were
often shown by the kind of relation created by the action
between the agent and God or the agent's neighbor. The Bibli-
cal teachings on masturbation and sodomy illustrate this. While
sodomy was explicitly condemned by St. Paul,"' it was only
implicitly condemned in the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. 9
But both the explicit and implicit judgments assert that it is the
sort of action that brings down divine wrath rather than favor. In
contrast, there are no unambiguous condemnations of masturba-
tion in the Bible, although the episode of Onan provides an
implicit rudimentary teaching against this action."0 Rather than
baldly condemning the action as wrong, the Biblical writers con-
demn it by associating the action with a severe punishment. It is
almost as if the Biblical authors were so ashamed of the topic that
they could not mention it, but when they did make mention of it,
they spoke of it as contrary to the holiness of God.
There are two perspectives on suicide in the Old Testament.
On the one hand, some suicides were condemned in various ways
by the Biblical writers. On the other hand, some reflexively
lethal acts were commanded or permitted by God to preserve or
promote obedience to God, such as the acts of Samson21 and
17. See Deuteronomy 19:1-13; Numbers 35:10-34.
18. 1 Corinthians 6:9-10.
19. Genesis 19:24.
20. Id. at 38:4-10.
21. Judges 16:23-31.
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Razis2 2, along with Abraham's near-slaying of Isaac. These com-
manded acts of suicide demonstrated that figures such as Abra-
ham were models of fidelity and loyalty to God, for they would
not allow even death to impede their duty to be faithful to God.
Both Razis and Samson were examples of this sort of self-killing
and their self-sacrifices illustrated their unswerving devotion to
God.
The story of Samson is one of an amoral giant with uncon-
trollable anger and lust who waged a war of private revenge
against the Philistines. 2' He was a unique figure with little reli-
gious aura, and his feats reached extravagant proportions
because he was the only one of his time who could give the Israe-
lites hope when they were wholly dominated by the Philistines.
Samson betrayed Yahweh by falling into illicit relationships with
Philistine women and this infidelity sapped his strength. He died
in an attempt to avenge and punish the Philistines for their irrev-
erence and oppression of the Israelites. But he was able to bring
death on them because his strength was restored after he
pledged his loyalty and obedience to Yahweh again.
Augustine and Aquinas argued that Samson's suicide was a
morally valid killing done under a divine command, and this may
have been true. Samson may have directly intended to kill the
Philistines under a divine command and thus indirectly killed
himself. Samson's death had a double meaning, for it was a sign
that Yahweh's favor and power had been restored through the
destruction of his enemies, and it also signified Yahweh's punish-
ment of Samson for his infidelity. The purpose of his death was
not to show that suicide is justified in some instances, but that his
self-sacrifice restored him to favor with Yahweh. The Samson epi-
sode showed that Yahweh would grant even physical strength to
those who were loyal and obedient to him, and even one as vio-
lent and uncontrollable as Samson could still serve Israel and
Yahweh.2 4
22. 2 Maccabees 14:37-46.
23. Judges 16:25-31.
24. See JOHN L. MCKENZIE, DICTONARY OF THE BIBLE 767 (1965). In
Hebrews 11:31-32, Samson was listed among the great men and women of the
Old Testament who, although they suffered grave moral faults, were saved by
faith. Included in this list were Gideon, who slew his daughter, and Rahab the
harlot. They were heroes of the Old Testament, and they showed that God
could accomplish his purposes through them despite their sinfulness and lack
of moral rectitude. McKenzie's view of Samson's death is unclear. He may not
have thought Samson committed suicide and thus did not see any moral
problem in the death of this giant, or he may have seen it as a grave fault for
which Samson should have been condemned. But it is difficult to believe that
McKenzie would have condoned his death if he believed it to be suicidal.
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Later Judaism was more tolerant of heroic suicide in defense
of the faith, as illustrated by the story of Razis, the temple high
priest.25 Nicanor the Greek sought to destroy Judaism and
thought the capture of one as noble as Razis would demoralize
the Jews. Razis was determined to frustrate this, and rather than
suffering capture, he tried to impale himself on his sword, but he
missed the stroke and then threw himself from a tower. Not yet
dead, he tore out his entrails and threw them among the
soldiers.26 Of all the suicides in the Old Testament, this one
alone seemed to be approved of because it showed an unswerv-
ing fidelity to the Law and hatred for those who persecuted the
Jews.
This Biblical attitude was mirrored by others of this era who
felt that it was morally legitimate to bring death upon oneself
when death was certain and imminent. The episode of Razis
illustrates not so much the moral permissibility of suicide as it
extols the heroic selflessness, devotion to God, and the resistance
of this Jewish leader who would not permit the Gentiles to defile
the Jews in any way. The death of Razis was tolerable, not
because it was suicidal, but because it was seen as the last and
only available means of protecting the faith from dishonor. It
was seen as a death virtually commanded by Yahweh, as was Sam-
son's. The episode does not argue as much for the permissibility
of suicide as it illustrates the sort of devotion to God the pious
Jew should have.
In a number of episodes in the Old Testament, people were
tempted to suicide, but did not go through with it. The story of
Jonah is the best example of this, a story strikingly similar to the
Elijah cycle.2" Jonah's story is one of a reluctant prophet who
was called to preach repentance to the Ninevites when the Israe-
lites detested them.28 It tells of the universalism of divine mercy
and forgiveness and of God's desire to give life and help to all.
Rather than heeding Yahweh's call to preach repentance, Jonah
boarded a ship headed in the opposite direction, and when he
was in danger of drowning, a giant fish was sent by Yahweh to
save his life. When he finally made it to Ninevah and preached a
message of repentance, the Ninevites bitterly disappointed him
by repenting. Jonah then went outside the city and sulked under
25. 2 Maccabees 14:37-46.
26. Id. at 14:46.
27. 1 Kings 19:1-21.
28. SeeJean C. McGowan, Jonah, in 1 THE JEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY
633, 633-37 (Raymond E. Brown et al. eds., 1968).
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a vine hoping that the Ninevites would be punished, and he
asked Yahweh for death.2
Whereas Elijah sulked under his broom tree and asked for
death because Israel would not repent,3 ° Jonah sulked because
Ninevah had repented. Rather than looking heroic, Jonah
appeared ridiculous. Elijah was in despair because the people
would not listen to his message. He was given a vision of angels
to bolster his spirits and fed by birds. Jonah was given a gourd
plant to shade and comfort him, but when it died he became
bitter and called on Yahweh to bring him death. Jonah fled the
Lord, while Elijah sought him in the wind, earthquake, and fire.
Because Jonah asked for death for narrow-minded and selfish
reasons, he was not given the comfort of revelations from Yahweh
as Elijah was, but was challenged with questions from God.
Jonah was in despair because Israel's enemy heeded. Yahweh's
command and Yahweh asked him the tantalizing question: "Are
you right to be angry?" Elijah asked for death because of the
obstinacy of Israel, and he was given encouragement and revela-
tions by God. With the death of the vine, Jonah was given a taste
of the treatment he asked Yahweh to give the Ninevites. In these
two stories, Yahweh did not grant permission for suicide for any
reason, neither for the altruistic reasons of Elijah nor the selfish
and despondent reasons of Jonah. God'did not want to bring
death to Ninevah, Elijah, or Jonah, but wanted all to live. God
even showed a desire to give life to all by using nature to save
them, for the crows fed Elijah and the whale saved Jonah. Jonah
and Elijah were like other prophets of the Old Testament who
wished for death: Moses,"1 Tobit,3 2 and Job.13 But Yahweh would
not grant their wishes, and he either questioned their motives or
gave them encouragement, aid, or revelations to help them in
their troubles.
A similar approach is found in the story of Tobit and Sarah.
This story aims to reassert the validity of faith and virtue at a time
when God has apparently abandoned his people.3 4 It also
affirms the need for family support, charity, and religious integ-
rity in times of persecution. Both Tobit and Sarah suffered
deeply from the cruel misfortune of the world, for Tobit was mys-
teriously blinded and Sarah became the victim of the cruel sport
29. Jonah 4:9.
30. 1 Kings 19:4-10.
31. Numbers 11:15.
32. Tobit 3:6.
33. Job 6:9, 7:15.
34. Demetrius R. Dumm, Tobit, Judith, Esther, in 1 THE JEROME BIBLIcAL
COMMENTARY, supra note 28, at 620, 621-22.
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of heartless women who reminded her of her failure as a
mother.3 5 Disconsolate at their cruelty, Sarah went to her room
intending to hang herself, but instead offered a prayer to God.3 6
In her suicidal grief, Sarah declared her innocence, and like
Tobit she asked God to let her die. Yahweh did not grant this
request. The angel Raphael brought Tobit's son Tobias to Sarah
to marry her and he also gave Tobit a cure for his blindness. As
is the case with Job, Yahweh did not permit suicide as an escape
from the cruelty and misfortune of the world. Instead, Yahweh
answered prayer, faith, and virtue with blessings and life. Sarah's
prayer was answered by the angel Raphael ("God heals") who
came and vindicated his faithful ones.31
The other type of suicide in the Old Testament was per-
formed by those who were utterly alienated from God. These
suicides were a sign not of devotion and loyalty to God, but of
total alienation from him. People committed suicide either
because they rebelled against God or because they alienated
themselves from divine favor by violating a grave religious duty.
The Scriptures did not explicitly and formally declare suicide to
be against the law of God, but they did portray those who deliber-
ately killed themselves without his authority to be alienated from
the life and holiness of God.
In a number of different situations, suicide was seen as an
alienation from the life of Yahweh. The best example was that of
Saul, who violated his divine consecration and was punished for
this by rebellion in his kingdom. Saul was specifically anointed
by Yahweh to be the great king and unifier of the Chosen People,
but he betrayed his mission by falling into sorcery, idolatry, and
witchcraft.3" For this, he slowly became entangled in the snares
of sin, infidelity, and death until he was so deeply enmeshed that
he could not escape. The depth of his involvement was con-
firmed by his self-killing. His life and actions were in sharp con-
trast to the Scriptural ideal of the God-fearing Israelite, who lived
out the full length of his days and saw his children's children
down to the seventh generation.
The stories of Saul, Zimri, Ahithophel, and laterJudas Iscar-
iot further illustrate the theme of self-killing as a sign of utter
alienation from God. Zimri was an officer of Elah, king of Israel,
who assassinated Elah's entire family, but he only reigned for a
single week before he was attacked by Omri and committed sui-
35. Tobit 3:8-10.
36. Id. at 3:10-17.
37. Id. at 5:4-22.
38. 1 Samuel 28:1-25.
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cide in a palace fire.-9 His name, hurled at Jehu by Jezebel in
scorn and condemnation, became an epithet for assassin.40
Ahithophel was a member of David's council, but he advised
Absolom to take possession of David's harem, which was a trea-
sonable act. Then he recommended that he pursue David and
kill him,4' and when this plan failed he hanged himself.42
B. The New Testament
In the New Testament, sin was regarded as the cause of
death.43 St. Paul explicitly held that all die in Adam but will rise
in Christ,44 and death was the last adversary of Christ. Christ
robbed death of its power, which made him Lord of life.45 Hav-
ing risen from the dead, death was powerless over him.46 The
Christian experiences victory over death by sharing in the death
of Christ in this life. In this, the "old person" is crucified and the
"new person" is raised up with Christ.47 Faith in Christ does not
protect the believer from death in this life, but gives him hope
that he will not suffer death eternally.4'
The suicide of Judas Iscariot illustrates the New Testament's
critical view of suicide, for he committed suicide in imitation of
Ahithophel and apparently was Ahithophel's New Testament
counterpart. By committing suicide just prior to the death of
Jesus, Judas ironically proclaimed Jesus to be in the line of the
Davidic kingship, just as the suicide of Ahithophel ironically pro-
claimed the kingship of David.49 Judas was chosen to be a mem-
ber of the apostolic community by Jesus, and thus he was given
privileged intimacy and knowledge of the Lord. But Judas
39. 1 Kings 16:9-10, 16:15-18.
40. 2 id. at 9:31.
41. 2 Samuel 17:1-2.
42. Id. at 17:23; see BATTIN, supra note 12, at 29. Battin notes that Zimri
and Abimilech also committed suicide and they did so in payment for their sins.
Id. She fails to see, however, that these Old Testament figures share a deeply
rooted sinfulness in common that drives them to self-destruction.
43. Romans 5:12.
44. 1 Corinthians 15:22.
45. See generally 2 Timothy 1:10.
46. Romans 6:8-10.
47. Id. at 6:1-11.
48. John 11:26.
49. There are different accounts of the death of Judas. Matthew, in the
only account in the Gospels of his death, claimsJudas hanged himself. Matthew
27:3-5. Acts of the Apostles suggests that he fell from a window, and there is no
hint of suicide. Papias held that he swelled to such monstrous proportions that
he could no longer pass where a horse and cart could easily drive through.
Kirsopp Lake, The Death ofJudas, in 5 THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY 22, 24 (F.
J. Foakes Jackson & Kirsopp Lake eds., 1966).
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rejected this call and betrayedJesus. 50 Because of this he was not
only denied knowledge of the Resurrected Lord, but he was also
shunned by the community.5" Christian tradition has long held
that Judas was the only one certainly excluded from the kingdom
because he did not repent of his suicide.5"
His betrayal and suicide gave new emphasis to the utter grav-
ity of his abandonment of the apostolic call.5" His suicide was a
sign of the total destruction of the life of God in him and his
complete immersion in death. Rather than being heralded as
one of the cornerstones of the Church as were all of the other
Apostles,Judas was reduced to shame. The frequency with which
he was denounced and rejected signifies the horror with which
early Christians regarded him. Jesus was rejected by the people
of his own town,54 the leaders of his own nation55 and even by his
own disciples.56 He was described as a "diabolos" in John's Gos-
pel, which possibly meant that he was the adversary or
"informer."57 John also called him a "thief" and credited him
with the ungracious and hypocritical remark at Bethany about
the anointing of Mary Magdalene.5"
Judas was portrayed as being so perverse that the meaning of
all his actions became twisted and perverted, and his sharing of
the Bread with the Lord at the Last Supper became an act of
division rather than communion. 59 The Last Supper was the
great prayer of the Christian people, and Judas could not bear
being among those who offered it because he had become so
50. Luke 6:16; Mark 3:19; Matthew 10:4.
51. Alvarez interprets the silence of Matthew over the suicide of Judas to
mean that he approved of the suicide as an atonement for his sins. This is an
eccentric opinion that would be quite out of character for the Evangelist and
inconsistent with the views of such suicides expressed elsewhere in Scripture.
See generally ALFRED ALVAREZ, THE SAVAGE GOD (1971).
52. Matthew 27:5. In John 13:27, John stated that Satan entered into
Judas and Jesus spoke in a manner that was similar to what was said in Mark
5:12 and Luke 8:30. Raymond Brown reminds us that in the Johannine
perspective, Judas was one of those who "preferred darkness to light because
their deeds were evil," and he notes that Satan formally entered the drama at
the Last Supper in the person of Judas. 29A RAYMOND E. BROWN, THE GOSPEL
ACCORDING TO JOHN 579 (1970) (quoting John 3:19).
53. The only group to venerate Judas was the Gnostic sect of the Cainites,
who regarded the GOd of the Old Testament as the cause of all evil in the
world. F. L. CROSS & E. A. LIVINGSTONE, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCH 219 (1974).
54. Luke 4:28-29.
55. Id. at 11:53-54, 19:47-48, 20:1-19.
56. Id. at 6:12-16.
57. MCKENZIE, supra note 24, at 463.
58. John 12:4-6.
59. Luke 22:21-23; Mark 14:17-21; Matthew 26:20-25.
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perverted. Even then he could not enter in the Light of Christ
but was driven by the powers of darkness to accomplish his act of
betrayal. Taking the Last Supper with the Lord had no effect on
him, for after that he still carried out his work of betrayal. Even
the kiss of fellowship in Gethsemane6" was a kiss of betrayal
rather than one of friendship; the act that epitomized friendship
became the sign of infidelity. Rather than being a model of
Christian life and discipleship, Judas was the paradigmatic
treacherous apostate, and his suicide signified that despairing
apostates such as he would be utterly cut off from salvation. His
infidelity stands in stark contrast to the loyalty of Jesus and Job
who were able to maintain fidelity even in the midst of great suf-
fering and trial. Judas was the complete antithesis of obedience
and devotion.
The best example of the attitude of the New Testament on
suicide is Paul's attempt to stop the jailer of Philippi in Acts of
the Apostles from killing himself when Paul and Silas were freed
from prison by an earthquake:
Late that night Paul and Silas were praying and singing
God's praises while the other prisoners listened. Suddenly
there was an earthquake that shook the prison to its foun-
dations. All the doors flew open and the chains fell from
all the prisoners. When the gaoler woke and saw the doors
wide open he drew his sword and was about to commit sui-
cide, presuming that the prisoners had escaped. But Paul
shouted at the top of his voice, 'Don't do yourself any
harm, we are all here.'
The gaoler called for lights, then rushed in, threw himself
trembling at the feet of Paul and Silas, and escorted them
out, saying, 'Sirs, what must I do to be saved?' They told
him, 'Become a believer in the Lord Jesus, and you will be
saved, and your household too.' Then they preached the
word of the Lord to him and to all his family.
61
This passage clearly shows the emptiness of claims that the New
Testament does not condemn suicide. In a situation in which
suicide would seem to be justifiable, the leading Christian Apos-
tle vigorously denounced self-killing and instead used a poten-
tially tragic situation to call the gaoler to faith.
This scene is important for Christian teaching on suicide
because it shows that the Apostolic verdict was clearly against sui-
cide. Standing second only to Peter, the Apostle of the Gentiles
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faith in the place of despair. In the very earliest years of the
Christian community, Paul made the Christian view of suicide
quite clear: faith in Christ delivers from death and suicide is not
acceptable for anyone, even the non-Christian.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATHOLIC
PROHIBITION OF SUICIDE
The Catholic view of suicide developed in the Greco-Roman
world where suicide was quite common, easily tolerated, seldom
condemned or criticized, sometimes applauded, and quite fre-
quently undertaken for the most trivial of reasons. These teach-
ings developed in protest to the abuse of life manifested in this
culture.
A. Suicidal Practices and Views in Antiquity
Suicide was probably rather common in Hellenic society,
despite the fact that extreme measures were sometimes taken to
curb it. Some educated Greeks raised strong moral objections to
suicide, but we know of only a few who protested with much
vigor. In Homeric times, suicide was often an act of revenge,
much as was the case in preliterate society, but suicide often
occurred for less vindictive reasons. Many early Greeks seemed
to have accepted some suicides to preserve "honor" as perfectly
legitimate, and they extolled these suicides in Greek mythology.
Post-Homeric Greek society became quite tolerant of suicide
and in many places actually encouraged it, particularly for sick-
ness, egregious crimes, military defeat, or political catastrophes.
On the island of Ceos, a supply of poison was stored to enable
those over a certain age to self-execute, 62 and it also seems that
the Athenians did this in great numbers.6" In the Greek colony
of Marseilles, magistrates kept a supply of poison for those
judged to have an adequate reason to kill themselves. The law
governing its use was clear:
Whoever no longer wishes to live shall state his reasons to
the Senate, and after having received permission shall
abandon life. If your existence is hateful to you, die; if you
are overwhelmed by fate, drink the hemlock. If you are
bowed with grief, abandon life. Let the unhappy man
62. See EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 218 (John A. Spaulding & George
Simpson trans., 1951).
63. VALERIAN MAxIMus, FACrORUM Ac DICToRuM MEMORABILIUM, LIBRI
Novi ii 6, 7 (1753). A similar law was instituted during the Reign of Terror. See
2 THOMAS CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 44-51 (1961); CHARLES MOoRE, A
FULL ENQUIRY 238 (1790).
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recount his misfortune, let the magistrate supply him with
the remedy, and his wretchedness will come to an end.64
But as tolerance of suicide developed, so also did a more
abusive and degrading view of human life. Athenaeus tells us
that the Thracians would play a game of hanging and would
fix a round noose to some high place, exactly beneath
which they place a stone.., then they cast lots, and he who
draws the lot, holding a sickle in his hand, stands upon the
stone, and puts his neck into the halter. Another person
then moves the stone from under him, and if he cannot
cut the rope in time with his sickle, he is hung; and the rest
laugh, thinking his death good sport.
65
At certain times individuals were required to commit sui-
cide.' The most famous of these was Themistokles, who offered
his services to the Persians after being banished from Athens.
When the Persians experienced difficulties defeating the Greek
navies, they called on him, but rather than subduing his own
country, he supposedly drank bull's blood.67 Another horrible
story is told of the town of Abydos, which suffered an epidemic of
suicides when Philip of Macedon's army approached.6" Philip
withdrew to prevent the suicides, but when he returned he found
all its inhabitants dead.
Greek philosophy and religion were generally critical of sui-
cide, but they did allow it for certain reasons. Pythagoras for-
bade men to "depart from their guard or station in life without
the order of their commander, that is, of God."69 The Orphic
cult objected to suicide and considered it a deliberate mutilation
of the property of the gods.7" Apuleius said that "the wise man
never throws off his body except by the will of God."71 In the
Laws, Plato generally opposed suicide except when one had been
struck down with calamity or poverty.72 But in the Phaedo, he
64. DURKHEIM, supra note 62, at 330.
65. HENRY R. FEDDEN, SUICIDE: A SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL STUDY 83-84
(1972).
66. See I WILLIAM E. H. LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MoRmS 228 (1870).
67. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 59.
68. See id. at 292.
69. CICERO, DE SENECTUTE XX (J.W. Allen & J. Greenough trans. & eds.,
Ginn 1886).
70. See KATHLEEN FREEMAN, THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS 14 (1946);
FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 71-72.
71. 1 LECKY, supra note 66, at 224 (quoting APULEIUS, DE PHILOS.). See
also PLATO, LAWS bk. I.
72. PLATO, LAws bk. 9.
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became much less tolerant of it.7" Plotinus admitted that there
could be cases of "stern necessity" when suicide would be legiti-
mate, but he was even less tolerant of suicide than Plato.74 Socra-
tes was not deterred from killing himself, even though he
considered the person to be the property of the gods, and yet
when he suspected that Porphyry wanted to commit suicide, he
went out of his way to convince him not to do so. Aristotle con-
sidered suicide unjust to the state, and he also believed it to be
an act contrary to courage, but he nonetheless permitted it in
some situations.75
The Romans acquired at least some of their views about the
value of life from the Greeks, but they gave suicide a scope,
dimension, and intensity not seen in the Hellenistic world.76
The Roman aristocracy and intelligentsia committed suicide to
preserve honor and escape shame, to prove one's patriotism, and
to show fidelity, but they-also committed suicide for frivolous rea-
sons in far greater numbers than did the Greeks, and they devel-
oped a propensity for suicide that was unseen before. 77
73. PLATO, PHAEDO, 61b-63a.
74. 1 PLOTINUS, THE ESSENTIAL PLOTINUS: REPRESENTATIVE TREATISES
FROM THE ENNEADS ix (Elmer O'Brien trans., 1964). He was less tolerant of it
probably because he saw it causing a disturbance to the soul. See 1 LECKY, supra
note 66, at 351.
75. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935,
977 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
76. Fedden and Albert Bayet, upon whom Fedden depends for much of
his moral analysis of suicide, demean this "suicide horror," but in doing this
they trivialize the scope and intensity of suicide in the Roman world in
particular. See generaUy ALBERT BAYET, LE SUICIDE ET LA MORALE (1922). One of
the first projects of the post-Constantinian Christians was to curb ancient
suicide, which was one of its greatest contributions not only to Western
civilization, but also to world civilization. See 2 LECKY, supra note 66, at 47-65.
Alvarez holds that the Roman law concerning suicide was simply practical,
with little spirit of revenge or vindictiveness. But he mentions only the
philosophical suicides, and says little of the desperate suicides of slaves,
prisoners of war, impoverished, lovelorn, weak, or immature. ALVAREZ, supra
note 51. His views are self-contradictory. He laments the deaths of so many
artists, poets, and writers, and yet when describing virtually the same
phenomenon in Rome, he lauds it as a superb example of liberty and
toleration. Id.
77. Concerning suicide in the Roman world, the historian of European
morality, Lecky, said the following:
A general approval of it floated down through most of the schools of
philosophy, and even to those who condemned it, it never seems to
have assumed its present aspect of extreme enormity. This was in the
first instance due to the ancient notion of death; and we have also to
remember, that when a society once learns to tolerate suicide, the
deed, in ceasing to be disgraceful, loses much of its actual criminality,
for those who are most firmly convinced that the stigma and suffering
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Historian Henry Fedden claims that suicide among the upper
classes of Roman society was common, but not among the
lower.78 This view is difficult to accept for two reasons. First, it
ignores the fact that suicide was so common in the Roman world
that it was known as "Roman death," and it would not have
acquired this infamy if it was restricted to the aristocracy. 79 Sec-
ond, the poor of Rome suffered hardship, poverty, servitude, cru-
elty, and ignorance so far beyond that experienced by the upper
classes that they would have even more reason for reflexive kill-
ing than did wealthy and powerful Romans. Whatever reasons
aristocratic Romans may have had for committing suicide were
insignificant in comparison to those of the Roman slaves or lower
classes. At slave auctions, sellers frequently had to verify that a
given slave did not have epilepsy or chronic ill health, and was
not prone to theft or suicide. ° And when defeated enemy
soldiers were taken back to Rome to be sold, they had to be
watched closely because so many of them committed suicide."
And if these classes along with the upper classes were committing
suicide frequently, it is quite likely that the lower classes did so as
well.
The suicides of Cato, Seneca, Marc Anthony, Brutus, and
Cleopatra are the most famous of the Republican era, and sug-
gest that suicide was widely practiced among the upper classes
even during the Republic. It is well known that many nobles
committed suicide to escape humiliation or for political reasons.
Cornelia killed herself after the defeat and death of Crassus, and
Arria killed herself after being discovered in plot against
Claudius. 2 The emperor Otho killed himself in 69 A.D. after he
retreated from a battle to prevent sacrificing more Roman
it now brings upon the family of the deceased do not constitute his
entire guilt, will readily acknowledge that they greatly aggravate it.
1 LECKY, supra note 66, at 226. He writes about Roman suicide:
From an early period, self-immolation, like that of Curtius or Decius,
had been esteemed in some circumstances a religious rite, being as
has been well suggested, probably a lingering remnant of the custom
of human sacrifices, and towards the closing day of paganism many
influences conspired in the same direction.
Id. at 228 (footnote omitted).
78. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 65.
79. 1 MOORE, supra note 63, at 245.
80. HAROLD WHETSTONE JOHNSTON, THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE ROMANS 104
(1932).
81. Id. at 105.
82. PLINY, EPisTLEs iii, 16 (Bibliophile Society, 1925); Dio's ROMAN
HISTORY bk. lx. See also Moom, supra note 63, at 258.
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soldiers in a civil war,8 3 and many of his soldiers were so moved
by his death that they killed themselves as well.
Suicides for purely "entertainment" purposes seemed to
have become rather common in the Republic and even more so
in the empire. Fedden claimed that it was easy to recruit individ-
uals at the time of the Punic Wars who would offer themselves to
be executed for rather small amounts of money, which would be
given to their heirs.8 4 And for a higher price, others could be
found to be slowly beaten and mangled to death, which created
an even greater spectacle.
Like some Greeks, Romans also committed suicide for exhi-
bitionist reasons. Peregrinus traveled through the empire
preaching contempt for death and claiming that he would com-
mit suicide as a sign of his disdain of death.85 He finally did this
with great fanfare by throwing himself on a flaming pyre at the
start of the Olympic games.8 6 Sardanapalus is reported to have
set 150 gold couches and tables on a vast pyre in a room and
collected 10 million talents of gold. He summoned his wife and
concubines and committed suicide by ordering his slaves to set it
on fire with him in the middle of it.87 Heliogalbus purchased a
rope of purple and gold and a golden sword, and ordered a pave-
ment ofjewels to be built between two towers from which he was
going to leap after stabbing himself. Unfortunately (from his
perspective), he was murdered by his guards before he could do
this.'
Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics urged suicide as a rational
way of preserving dignity and honor, and even as a duty in some
instances.89 Epicurus said "that one must weigh carefully
whether one preferred to wait for death or artificially to forestall
it."90 Epictetus said that
[a]bove all things, remember that the door is open. Be not
more timid than boys at play. As they, when they cease to
take pleasure in their games declare that they will no
83. THE OXFORD CLAsSIcAL DICTIONARY 763 (N.G.L. Hammond & H.H.
Scullard eds., 2d ed 1970).
84. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 84. See also ALvAREz, supra note 51, at 67.
85. THE OxFoRD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 799.
86. Id.
87. SicuLus DIODORUS, THE ANTIQUITIES OF ASIA, ii bk 2, 23-27 (Edwin
Murphy trans., 1989).
88. II A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN BIOGRAPHY AND MyTH 7
(William Smith, ed., 1916).
89. See 1 LECKY, supra note 66, at 222-33.
90. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 81.
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longer play, so do you, when all things begin to pall upon
you, retire; but if you stay, do not complain.9
Seneca permitted suicide, but he admitted that he had to curb
the passion for suicide among some of his followers.92 He wrote:
As I choose the ship in which I will sail, and the house I will
inhabit, so I will choose the death by which I will leave
life.93
He believed it was braver to face death than one's troubles, and
he asserted that he would not relinquish
old age if it leaves my better part intact. But if it begins to
shake my mind, if it destroys its faculties one by one, if it
leaves me not life but breath, I will depart from the putrid
or tottering edifice. I will not escape by death from disease
so long as it may be healed, and leaves my mind
unimpaired. I will not raise my hand against myself on
account of my pain, for so to die is to be conquered. But if
I know that I must suffer without hope of relief, I will
depart, not through fear of pain itself, but because it pre-
vents all for which I would live.94
Musonius claimed that
U]ust as a landlord who has not received his rent, pulls
down the doors, removes the rafters, and fills up the well,
so I seem to be driven out of this little body, when nature,
which has let it to me, takes away one by one, eyes and ears,
hands and feet. I will not therefore delay any longer, but
will cheerfully depart as from a banquet.95
The Stoics believed it was brave and honorable to face the
knife, for none of the beasts could die in such a way. Attalus
advised Marcellinus, who was contemplating suicide:
Be not tormented, my Marcellinus, as if you were deliberat-
ing of any great matter. Life is a thing of no dignity or
importance. Your very slaves, your animals, possess it in
common with yourself: but it is a great thing to die honor-
ably, prudently, bravely. Think how long you have been
engaged in the same dull course: eating, sleeping and
indulging your appetites. This has been the circle. Not
91. EPICTETus: THE DISCOURSES AND MANUAL bk. 1, ch. 24 (P.E.
Matheson ed, 1938).
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only a prudent, brave, or a wretched man may wish to die,
but even a fastidious one.9 6
Marcellinus took his advice and starved himself to death.97
The Stoics and Epicureans looked on suicide as a purely per-
sonal affair that was permitted under any circumstance and cer-
tainly desirable when there were issues of dishonor, old age, or
illness at stake. The Epicureans allowed it when one's pain over-
came the pleasure to be found in one's life, and the Epicureans
were not far behind the Stoics in their disregard for the value of
human life. Lucretius the Epicurean poet wrote:
If one day, as well may happen, life grows wearisome, there
only remains to pour a libation to death and oblivion. A
drop of subtle poison will gently close your eyes to the sun,
and waft you smiling into the eternal night whence every-
thing comes and to which everything returns.98
B. Early Christian Views
The early Christians protested vigorously against many of
the cruelties that led others to suicide. But in contrast to their
predecessors, they did not commit suicide in protest, and the
practices they found objectionable often vanished almost imme-
diately after Christianity was legally tolerated. The Christians
abolished the practice of forcing others to commit suicide as did
the Greeks and Romans, and the Greek custom of the state hold-
ing stores of poison for those who wished to end their lives was
also eliminated. Roman exhibitionist suicide vanished, and there
is little evidence during the medieval period of people commit-
ting suicide to avoid slavery or serfdom as was often the case in
antiquity. The uniquely Roman types of suicide found in the col-
iseums, palaces, and slave camps ended quickly. The Roman
practice of generals, political leaders, and nobles killing them-
selves to avoid disgrace virtually vanished.99 In light of all the
pagan cruelties abolished by the medieval Christians, the claim
that the medievals did not have respect for pagan life dissolves
into fantasy. 100
96. Id. at 80.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 81.
99. 2 LEcKY, supra note 66, at 57.
100. Lecky argues:
Direct and deliberate suicide, which occupies so prominent a place in
the moral history of antiquity, almost absolutely disappeared within
the Church; but beyond its pale, the Circumcellions, in the fourth
century, constituted themselves as the apostles of death, and not only
carried to the highest point the custom of provoking martyrdom, by
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The early orthodox Christian church issued few official
moral condemnations of suicide, or of any action for that matter,
even though the great proportion of early Christian writers con-
demned deliberate self-killing vigorously.1"' The lack of "offi-
cial" condemnations of suicide, however, does not mean that the
early Church endorsed or permitted it. The early Church pro-
duced many theological and moral writings against suicide, and
these views later came to be expressed in councillor and juridical
documents after Constantine granted legal status to the Church.
It was against an evident disregard for the treasure of human
life that St. Augustine articulated his views on suicide, which rap-
idly became the mainstream and dominant attitude toward sui-
cide in Latin Christianity. In his The City of God, he argued that
Christians do not commit suicide in any circumstance and that
they have no authority to self-execute. Augustine's arguments
here are quite clear: suicide is wrong because it is deliberate kill-
ing of the innocent.
For it is clear that if no one has a private right to kill even a
guilty man (and no law allows this), then certainly anyone
who kills himself is a murderer, and is the more guilty in
killing himself the more innocent he is of the charge on
which he has condemned himself to death. We rightly
abominate the act of Judas, and the judgment of truth is
that when he hanged himself he did not atone for the guilt
of his detestable betrayal but rather increased it, since he
despaired of God's mercy and in a fit of self-destructive
remorse left himself no chance of a saving repentance.
How much less right has anyone to indulge in self-slaugh-
ter when he can find in himself no fault to justify such a
punishment! For when Judas killed himself, he killed a
criminal, and yet he ended his life guilty not only of
Christ's death, but also of his own; one crime led to
another. 102
challenging and insulting the assemblies of the Pagans, but even killed
themselves in great numbers, imagining, it would seem, that this was a
form of martyrdom, and would secure for them eternal salvation.
2 id. at 52.
101. See generally M. ADRIAEN, IN AMos II, 5 (1963); SAINT BASIL, II
LETTERS 188 in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH (Agnes C. Way trans., notes by Roy
J. Deferarri 1955). BAYET, supra note 76, at 322; CAsSiAN, DE INSTITuriS
COENOBIORUM bk. ix, ch. 9 (F. Gibson trans., 1894); CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA,
STROM. bk. IV (1933); JEROME, To EUSTOCmUM, Letter 22 (Frederick A. Wright
trans., 1933).
102. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD bk. I, ch. 17 (Henry Bettenson trans.,
Penguin Books 1972).
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On the grounds that the law against killing forbids destroy-
ing all innocent human beings, including oneself, Augustine
argued that there was never a legitimate reason to commit sui-
cide. He wrote:
10 3
It is significant that in the sacred canonical books there
can nowhere be found any injunction or permission to
commit suicide either to ensure immortality or to escape
any evil. In fact we must understand it to be forbidden by
the law 'You shall not kill,' particularly as there is no addi-
tion of 'your neighbor' as in the prohibition of false wit-
ness, 'You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.'
But that does not mean that a man who gives false witness
against himself is exempt from guilt, since the rule about
loving one's neighbor begins with oneself, seeing that the
Scripture says 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.'
1°4
Augustine condemned suicide not only because it was culpable
killing, but also because it was against the virtue of fortitude.
The pagans held up Cato and Regulus as exemplary suicides, but
Augustine pointed out that both of them were defeated and
beaten men: Cato by Caesar and Regulus by the Carthageni-
ans.1°5 He denied categorically that suicide showed greatness of
soul or virtue.106 Instead, he wrote that self-assassination shows
that one lacks the strength to endure hardships.1" 7
Furthermore, Augustine argued that it is not permissible to
kill oneself to avoid falling into the hands of one's enemies, for
the Patriarchs, Jesus Christ, and the Apostles did not do so. l Os
What we are saying, asserting, and establishing by all means
at our command is this: that no one ought deliberately to
bring about his own death by way of escaping from tempo-
ral troubles, for fear that he may fall into eternal afflic-
tions; it is wrong to commit suicide because of the sins of
others, for this is to bring upon oneself a heavy burden of
sin, whereas another's sin could not defile one or because
of one's past sins, for one has more need of this life on
their account, so that those sins may be healed by repen-
103. Augustine states "[i]f this is so, it remains that we take the command
'You shall not kill' as applying to human beings, that is, other persons and
oneself. For to kill oneself is to kill a human being." Id. at bk. I, ch. 20.
104. Id. at bk. I, ch. 20.
105. Id. at bk. I, ch. 23-24.
106. Id at bk. I, ch. 22.
107. Id. at bk. I, ch. 22. In Cato and other noble Romans who suicided to
preserve honor and dignity, Augustine found "weakness in a mind which
cannot bear physical oppression, or the stupid opinion of the mob." Id.
108. Id. at bk. I, ch. 22.
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tance; or through longing for a better life, hoped for after
death, for those guilty of their death are not received after
death into that better life. 1°9
Augustine did not believe suicide to be "irrational" in some
instances and situations, but he believed that the Christians had
better examples of coping with suffering and defeat in the
figures of Job, the Apostles, and Jesus himself than in suicidal
figures."
There are however certain exceptions to the law against
killing, made by the authority of God himself. There are
those whose killing God orders, either by a law, or by an
express command to a particular person at a particular
time. In fact one who owes a duty of obedience to the
giver of the command does not himself 'kill' - he is an
instrument, a sword in its user's hand. For this reason the
commandment forbidding killing was not broken by those
who have waged wars on the authority of God, or those
who have imposed the death-penalty on criminals when
representing the authority of the State in accordance with
the laws of the State, the justest and most reasonable
source of power. When Abraham was ready to kill his son,
so far from being blamed for cruelty he was praised for his
devotion; it was not an act of crime, but of obedience. One
is justified in asking whether Jephtha is to be regarded as
obeying a command of God in killing his daughter, when
he had vowed to sacrifice to God the first thing he met
when returning victorious from battle. And when Samson
destroyed himself, with his enemies, by the demolition of
the building, this can only be excused on the ground that
the Spirit, which performed miracles through him, secretly
ordered him to do so. With the exception of these killings
prescribed generally by a just law, or specially commanded
by God himself - the source ofjustice - anyone who kills
a human being, whether himself or anyone else, is involved
in a charge of murder. 1 '
To avoid defilement, some women in Augustine's time com-
mitted suicide, and their acts were extolled by some Fathers,
109. Id. at bk. I, ch. 26. In this condemnation, Augustine is striking at two
of the most common motives for suicide: desire for a better life, and guilt,
ostensibly over the wrongful actions of others, but more probably and
realistically over one's own guilt.
110. Id. at bk. I, ch. 24.
111. Id. at bk. I, ch. 21 (citations omitted).
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while others were highly critical of them. 1 2 These sorts of sui-
cide were very difficult to condemn, for the motives were excep-
tionally laudable even though the acts were reprehensible.11
Augustine, however, would not countenance these acts even to
protect virginity, for even though these women would be rav-
ished, they could retain their innocence, and self-murder would
be far worse than being molested.'14 Augustine and others
thought that a virgin who committed suicide to prevent being
raped committed a crime far worse than what the rapist would do
and brought guilt on herself that she could have otherwise
avoided:
But how was it that she [Lucretia] who did not commit
adultery received the heavier punishment? For the adul-
terer was driven from his country, with his father; his victim
suffered the supreme penalty. . . . The highly extolled
Lucretia also did away with the innocent, chaste, outraged
Lucretia. Give your sentence. Or if you cannot do this,
because the culprit is not present to receive the punish-
ment, why do you extol with such praises the killer of the
chaste and innocent .... Such has not been the behavior
of Christian women. When they were treated like this they
did not take vengeance on themselves for another's crime.
They would not add crime to crime by committing murder
on themselves in shame because the enemy had committed
rape on them in lust.'1"
Augustine thought it worse for a woman to commit self-murder
than to suffer rape. Despite the seeming harshness of his judg-
ment, there is a persuasive consistency to his reasoning. More-
over, he believed that the early Christian virgins who committed
suicide to preserve their chastity were either acting under divine
command or were simply mistaken in their judgment.' 16
112. The most famous of these cases was that of Pelagia who was
abducted by soldiers, but excused herself before they ravished her, and went to
her room, where she threw herself from her window to escape being attacked.
Augustine condemned this even though it was approved by St. Ambrose. Id. at
bk. I, ch 26, n.70.
113. Alvarez attributes rejection of suicide to preserve one's virginity by
the early Church to Augustine's authority. Augustine argued that if one killed
oneself to atone for one's sins, one was usurping the authority of the Church
and the state. And if one suicided while innocent and to avoid sin, one was
putting blood on one's hands, which was wrong. And Augustine considered
suicide worse than other sins because one could not repent of it. See ALvAREz,
supra note 51, at 70.
114. AUGUSTINE, supra note 102, bk. I, ch. 18.
115. Id. at bk. I, ch. 19.
116. Id. at bk. I, ch. 26.
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Augustine rejected the idea that one should commit suicide
to avoid committing sin, for if that was permissible, confessors
could urge penitents to kill themselves after being absolved of
their sins to avoid falling into further sin. 11 7
There remains one situation in which it is supposed to be
advantageous to commit suicide; I have already begun to
discuss this question. It arises when the motive is to avoid
falling into sin either through the allurements of pleasure
or through the menaces of pain. If we agree to allow this
motive we shall not be able to stop until we reach the point
when people are to be encouraged to kill themselves for
preference, immediately they have received forgiveness of
all sins by washing in the waters of holy regeneration. For
that would be the time to forestall all future sins - the
moment when all past sins have been erased. If self-
inflicted death is permitted, surely this is the best possible
moment for it! When a person has been thus set free why
should he expose himself again to all the perils of this life,
when it is so easily allowed him to avoid them by doing
away with himself? And the Bible says, 'A man who is fond
of danger will fall into it'. Why are men so fond of all these
great dangers, or at any rate are willing to accept them, by
remaining in this life, when they are allowed to depart
from it? If a man has a duty to kill himself to avoid suc-
cumbing to sin because he is at the mercy of one man, who
holds him prisoner, does he suppose that he has to go on
living so as to endure the pressures of the actual world,
which is full of temptations at all times, temptations such as
that which is dreaded under one master, and innumerable
others, which are the necessary accompaniment of this
life? 1 18
Augustine argued that this would be the most persuasive argu-
ment for suicide possible, and yet he denied it was sound. He
would not endorse suicide as a means to escape disgrace or avoid
punishment, regarding that means as an illicit attempt to atone
for guilt.119 The guilt of one who kills himself to escape punish-
ment increases in relationship to his innocence.
Margaret Battin suggests that the basis of the traditional
Catholic teaching on suicide was Augustine's opposition to the
practices of the Circumcellions and Donatists, who killed them-
selves or had themselves killed to gain salvation, and not an argu-
117. Id. at bk. I, ch. 27.
118. Id. (citation omitted).
119. Id. at bk. I, ch. 17.
1995]
472 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
ment against the morality of suicide. 2 ° The implication here is
that Augustine would not have argued against the practice if
these fanatics had not made the orthodox Christians look bad.
But in claiming this as the basis of Augustine's views, Battin is
reducing the Catholic moral objection to suicide to a political
objection: the orthodox Christians were trying to protect the rep-
utation of true and legitimate martyrs against the fanatical, sui-
cidal Circumcellions. In fact, Augustine was the first Christian
author to write extensively about suicide, even though he was
hardly the first to condemn it, and he did so for many reasons,
not just because the Circumcellions and Donatists were practic-
ing self-murder in the name of Christ. Had the Circumcellion
extremists never arisen, orthodox Christians still would have con-
demned suicide vigorously because it was direct killing of the
innocent and because it was so widespread in the empire. Augus-
fine's condemnation thus was not merely an aspect of an overall
anti-Donatist political strategy. Furthermore, Augustine's posi-
tion was endorsed in the Middle Ages, not because of Christian
opposition to the Donatists or Circumcellions, but because of the
perceived moral correctness of his teaching. Certainly the pecu-
liar nature of the Donatists, Circumcellions, and the Church in
North Africa made suicide a problem that the Church had to
resist aggressively. However, before and after the emergence of
the Circumcellions and Donatists, there was such a clear and
strong aversion to killing among the orthodox Christians that sui-
cide was not a major problem for them.
Without doubt, there is some truth in the view that Augus-
tine condemned suicide partly because of fanatics, and partly
because it challenged and threatened Catholic integrity, ortho-
doxy, zeal, and ardor. But that is not the whole story. Augustine
also argued with pagans who presented their heroes like Cato
and Seneca as so virtuous that they committed suicide to preserve
their virtue. Battin misunderstands the threat of the Circumcel-
lions and Donatists to the Church, and she overstates their
threat. In fact, they were strong only in small areas of North
Africa. The famous Augustine scholar, Peter Brown, correctly
shows that the threat of the Donatists and Circumcellions was
relatively insignificant because they were inordinately concerned
with preserving the purity of the Christian faith against the new
Christians admitted to the post-Constantinian church. 2 They
had more of an effect on Catholic sacramental theology than on
Catholic moral teaching, and Orthodox Christianity condemned
120. BATTIN, supra note 12, at 64-65.
121. PETER RI. BROWN, AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO 213-24 (1969).
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Donatist and Circumcellion suicides as part of its overall attempt
to stop the abuses of human life that were so common in the
latter Roman Empire. If the Donatists and Circumcellions posed
any threat to orthodox Christians, it was because they made the
more moderate Christians appear lax, sinful, and tepid in com-
parison to those who were willing to kill themselves as a twisted
symbol of their devotion to God. However, this was not a great
problem for the orthodox. Their lack of scruple about self-exe-
cution threatened to make the orthodox Christians who rejected
suicide as a sign of faith appear uncommitted and morally lax.
The orthodox Latin Christian resistance to suicide expressed
itself in forgiveness of those who apostasized and sought penance
and forgiveness; and this spirit of forgiveness angered the fanatic
Donatists and Circumcellions, for they believed that handing
over the sacred books to the Romans was intolerable, that salva-
tion could be found only through martyrdom, and that any
refusal of martyrdom was equal to apostasy. The Donatists' sui-
cidal tendencies were too extreme for most Christians, and they
posed less of a threat to the credibility of the Church than did
their unfounded claim that the Christians suffered from loose
morals.
The continuation of the ancient Christian prohibition of sui-
cide into Medieval Christianity was extraordinarily effective.
What is striking about the history of suicide in the Middle Ages is
that there were few notable suicides between 400 and 1400 A.D.
among orthodox Christians.122 Catholic doctrines and attitudes
had so permeated society during this era that individuals did not
find suicide to be an efficient means of resolving personal, finan-
cial or political issues. Medieval Catholicism had given such
emphasis to repentance, confession, and penance that suicide to
escape shame virtually disappeared. In antiquity, suicide on
account of poverty was not uncommon, but medieval society
removed the stigma of poverty far more than other societies, and,
as a result, there were an insignificant number of suicides.'23
Catholicism's emphasis on the value of the life of poverty and
122. See 2 LECKY, supra note 66, at 56.
123. Fedden, hardly a friend of medieval Catholicism, writes the
following:
Poverty carried no moral stigma: you were not bad, or stupid, or
undesirable, simply because you were poor. In the capaciousness of
an all-comprehensive Church, and at his particular post within the
feudal hierarchy (that state of life to which God had called him), the
poor man could feel a certain equality and sense of fellowship with the
richest. He was acknowledged to be a part of the whole. Property
involved duties first and foremost; it was primarily a trust rather than a
source of income. Poverty on the other hand had acquired, from
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simplicity destroyed the grounds of suicide to escape the shame
of poverty.
Medieval Christianity did not allow suicide as an escape from
suffering. It believed a better way of dealing with suffering than
self-execution was to face it in a spirit of Christian faith, hope,
and charity. Medieval Christians asked why one should self-exe-
cute to escape suffering when acceptance of suffering in Chris-
tian faith, hope, and charity could bring one eternal life. These
Christians were not insensitive to the needs of the suffering, but
they objected to what they saw as the profitlessness of suicide.
The old Roman practice of philosophical, political, and military
suicide almost totally vanished in medieval Christian Europe.124
Heterodox Christians, however, seemed to have committed sui-
cide with much greater frequency than did the orthodox, for
they were more isolated and were less influenced than the ortho-
dox by the Christian teachings on suicide.
The canonical and ecclesiastical punishments of suicide
became stronger through the centuries, and these worked to
limit the practice of suicide. The Council of Nimes refused to
grant those who killed themselves a Christian burial. 25 The
Council of Orleans in 533 forbade burial of those who killed
themselves while standing accused of crimes, 126 and the Council
of Braga in 563 similarly forbade Christian burial to anyone who
committed suicide. 127 This prohibition was affirmed by the
Council of Auxerre fifteen years later,12" and the Council of
Arles forbade families to commit suicide. 129 In 590, the Council
of Antisidor held that no one could make offerings to expiate
religious associations, a certain mystical importance and glamour ....
For these reasons, poverty rarely seemed a sufficient cause for suicide.
FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 200.
124. According to O'Dea, "[d]eliberate suicide seems to have ceased
almost entirely with the establishment of Christianity, and to have continued in
abeyance until the reign of philosophical skepticism." J.J. O'DEA, SUICIDE:
STUDIES IN ITS PHILOSOPHY 85 (1970). This is a judgment few philosophers or
historians would disagree with. See also 2 LECKY, supra note 66, at 52. Alvarez
notes that John Donne in his Biathanatos was the first Renaissance thinker to
challenge the Christian teachings on suicide in a thousand years, which is a
backhanded compliment on the power of the medieval prohibitions of suicide.
He admits that the medieval Christian was brutal in condemning suicide, but
this probably came from a concern for the soul of the suicidal person. ALVAREZ,
supra note 51, at 153-161.
125. XXIV GIovAN DOMENICO MANSI, SACRORUM CONCILIORUM NOVA ET
AMPLISSIMA COLLECTIo 546 (1960).
126. ALvAREz, supra note 51, at 71.
127. XVI MANSI, supra note 125, at bk. IX, 779.
128. XVII MANSI, supra note 125, at bk. IX, 913.
129. LII MANSI, supra note 125, at bk. VII, 884.
CATHOLIC TEACHINGS ON SUICIDE
their suicide,13 0 and in 878, the Council of Tryoes permitted the
burial of those who committed suicide. Later, Pope Nicholas I,
who died in 867, required the burial of all people who had killed
themselves.1 3 1 Early canon law was as severe in condemning sui-
cide as were the decrees of Councils; the Decretals of Gratian
condemned suicide,1 32 and the great medieval canonists
Burchard of Worms, Ivo of Chartres, and Gratian all upheld this
condemnation.13 3
In addition to developing canons on this issue, the Church
urged secular rulers to take measures against suicide, and their
cooperation created more effective curbs on suicide than had
ever been seen in European history. Medieval civil laws against
suicide initially imposed few penalties, probably because suicide
was so infrequent, but also because the preaching of the era was
so effective against it. Over time, kings and rulers began to
impose penalties, fines, and punishments for suicide, and by the
High Middle Ages, virtually all European kingdoms imposed
some sort of penalty or forfeiture on those who attempted or
committed suicide, even though the civil law of most of these
kingdoms made concessions to those who attempted suicide
because of insanity or extreme duress.1 3 4 Various social customs
emerged to deter potential suicides, even though few of these
customs can be countenanced today.13 5 The custom of humiliat-
ing the corpse to deter future possible suicides developed at this
time. The bodies of those who committed suicide were beaten,
hung out in public, or sent down rivers in barrels, and the inheri-
tances of their families were confiscated.136
130. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 134.
131. See BAYET, supra note 76, at 409; XV MANsi, supra note 125, at 401
(1960). This relaxation did not continue, however, probably because an
increase in suicides resulted from this relaxation of strictures.
132. See Alphonse van Howe, Commentarium Lovaniese in CODICEM IURIS
CANONICI tom. 1, ch. X, 4 (2d ed. 1945).
133. See P. FouRNIER, UN ToURNANT DANS L'HISTOIRE DU DRorr 129
(1917).
134. 2 LECKY, supra note 66, at 53-65.
135. King St. Louis (1214-1276) ordered confiscation of the property of
people who had committed suicide. The Council at Braga forbade interring
them in consecrated ground, and some countries did not permit the removal of
a person who had committed suicide through the door of a house, meaning
they could only be removed by making a hole in the wall. Elsewhere, people
who committed suicide were dragged through the streets, thrown into sewers,
or transfixed on a stake along public highways. 2 id. at 53.
136. A credible account of the measures taken by civil authorities in the
Middle Ages is given by Bayet. BAYET, supra note 76, at 437-39. See also FEDDEN,
supra note 65. Fedden, who is hardly sympathetic to the medieval approach to
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Devoting an entire question of his Summa Theologica to that
of suicide, Aquinas gave the Church's teachings on this issue
their best expression. In response to five specific Objections to
the ban on suicide,13 7 Aquinas writes:
I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for
three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves
itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself
in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can. Where-
fore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to
charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence sui-
cide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural
law and to charity.
Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the
whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as
such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing him-
self he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares
(Ethic, v. 11).
Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to
His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever
takes his own life, sins against God, even as he who kills
another's slave, sins against that slave's master, and as he
who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted
to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sen-
suicide, admits that it was civil authorities and not ecclesiastical authorities who
called for punishments as a deterrent to suicide.
137. The objections were as follows:
Objection 1. It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder
is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an
injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v. 11. Therefore no man sins
by killing himself.
Obj. 2 Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to
kill evildoers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an
evildoer. Therefore, he may lawfully kill himself.
Ob. 3 Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser
danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man to cut
off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole body.
Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil, for
example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore, a man may
kill himself.
Obj. 4 Further, Samson killed himself, as related in judges vcxxvi., and
yet he is numbered among the saints (Heb. xi). Therefore it is lawful
for a man to kill himself.
Obj. 5 Further it is related (2 Mach. xiv 42) that a certain Razis killed
himself, choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked,
and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth. How nothing that is done
nobly and braely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is not unlawful.
THoMAs AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II quest. 64, art. 5 (Fathers of the Eng-
lish Dominican Province trans., 1947).
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tence of death and life, according to Deut. xxxii, 39, I will
kill and I will make to live.
Reply Obj. 1. Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary
to justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a
man should have towards himself: in this respect suicide is
a sin in relation to oneself. In relation to the community
and to God, it is sinful, by reason also of its opposition to
justice.
Reply Obj. 2. One who exercises public authority may law-
fully put to death an evildoer, since he can pass judgment
on him. But no man is judge of himself. Wherefore it is
not lawful for one who exercises public authority to put
himself to death for any sin whatever, although he may law-
fully commit himself to the judgment of others.
Reply Obj. 3. Man is made master of himself through his
free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to
those matters which pertain to this life as ruled by man's
free-will. But the passage from this life to another and hap-
pier one is subject not to man's free-will but to the power
of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take his own life
that he may pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape
any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because
the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore, to bring
death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions
of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a
lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one's own life
on account of one's having committed a sin, both because
by so doing one does oneself a very great injury, by depriv-
ing oneself of the time needful for repentance, and
because it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the
sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for a
woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she
ought not to commit on herself the very great sin of sui-
cide, to avoid the lesser sin of another. For she commits
no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not
consent, since without consent of the mind there is no stain on
the body, as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident
that fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than tak-
ing a man's life, especially one's own life: since the latter is
most grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom one
owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous
since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance.
Again it is not lawful to take his own life for fear he should
consent to sin, because evil must not be done that good may
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come (Rom. iii, 8) or that evil may be avoided, especially if
the evil be of small account and an uncertain event, for it is
uncertain whether one will at some future time consent to
a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any
temptation whatever.
Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21) not even
Samson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his
enemies under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who
had wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded
him to do this. He assigns the same reason in the case of
certain holy women, who at the time of persecution took
their own lives, and who are commemorated by the
Church.
Reply Obj. 5. It belongs to fortitude that a man does not
shrink from being slain by another, for the sake of the
good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin. But that a man
take his own life in order to avoid penal evils has, indeed
an appearance of fortitude (for which reason some, among
whom was Razis, having killed themselves thinking to act
from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a
weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils as the Philoso-
pher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei i. 22, 23)
declare.1
38
In contrast to Augustine, Aquinas argued against suicide
because it was contrary to nature and the virtues. He presented
some new arguments against suicide and, following Augustine,
he held that it was not only against love, but also against forti-
tude, temperance, hope and faith, prudence, our obligations in
justice to .the community and God, and ultimately our natural
inclination to life. Suicide is contrary to charity, proper self-love,
justice, fortitude, the legitimate prerogatives of the common
good, the demands of a proper relationship with God, and is an
evil means to a good end when it is performed to escape suffer-
ing, shame, or an occasion of sin.
Suicide is contrary not only to the moral but to the theologi-
cal virtues as well, according to Aquinas. He writes that the aim
of Christian life was to grow in both the cardinal and theological
virtues and develop our powers to act well and virtuously in all
situations, and the virtues that bring this about are prudence,
temperance, justice, fortitude, faith, hope, and charity. Pru-
dence requires us to form our actions in such a way that true and
greatest good comes from them. 3 9 Temperance enables us to
138. Id.
139. Id. at quest. 67, art. 6.
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restrain our drives and tastes for pleasure so that they do not do
evil in their pursuit.14 ° Justice enables us to give others what is
their due, and it equips us to effect what is good in complicated
situations.14' Finally, fortitude gives the ability to do what is good
in spite of trying and difficult circumstances. 142 Aquinas con-
demned suicide as contrary to fortitude because the suicidal per-
son does what is evil, when doing what is right and good is
difficult. All have a responsibility to develop their ability to do
what is right, not only when this is easy, but also when this
involves some difficulty. Fortitude enables one to do what is
good in spite of the pain, suffering, or loss that one might experi-
ence in seeking to do the good action. The demands of fortitude
differ from case to case, but one who deliberately kills another
innocent person because of fear violates the virtue of fortitude.
Less proximately, suicide is contrary to the virtues of temperance
and prudence. Often, individuals kill themselves by letting emo-
tions of self-pity get the best of them, and they violate temper-
ance, which requires people to not let disorderly emotional states
lead them into sin. It violates prudence as well because it is not a
morally good means (deliberately destroying innocent human
life) to a morally legitimate end.
For Aquinas, suicide was against justice because deliberately
destroying innocent human life is not an act that is properly due
one who is innocent of unjust aggression. Innocent human life
deserves to be protected, and justice demands that it only be
indirectly and unintentionally destroyed if absolutely necessary
for the sake of other proportionate goods or values. Aquinas also
objected to suicide because it was against the virtue of hope that
gave individuals the motivation to seek to do what was truly good,
especially in difficult circumstances.143 In a suicidal action, one
reacts to stress, threats, and demands so violently that one
destroys life to escape, while hope prohibits allowing even
desperation or despair to justify acts of self-destruction. For
Aquinas, suicide also compromised the virtue of faith.' 44 In the
140. Id. at quest. 141, art. 4.
141. Id. at quest. 58, art. 1.
142. Id. at quest. 58, art. 1.
143. Id. at quest. 20, art. 4. An action is against hope if the person brings
a greater evil on himself or herself than the evil they are seeking to avoid.
Suicide is thus contrary to hope because in a suicidal act, the person commits a
greater evil than what is feared and avoided, and for this reason the common
morality would argue against it.
144. Aquinas holds that suicide is against the virtue of faith because it is
against love. And as faith is a species of love, suicide would also be against faith.
Id. at quest. 4, art. 3. Charity is the "form" of faith, as it is of all the virtues, so an
act against charity, such as suicide, would also be contrary to faith.
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Catholic perspective, all evils have been placed under the power
of Christ, and while this does not imply freedom from all tempta-
tion, it does mean that the grace and power of Christ will not
allow us to be ultimately overwhelmed by evil. To self-execute in
the face of evil is to implicitly deny that Christ has finally and
definitively overcome it. Suicide implies that sin, despair and
death ultimately triumph over him, and that Christ's victory was
incomplete or empty.
Suicide also violates charity, the virtue requiring one to do
good to all, even to oneself.14 5 One must always do good and
never deliberately do harm; but in a suicidal act, one inflicts the
greatest physical harm possible on oneself. This command
means that destroying oneself to avoid pain, suffering, despair, or
death is against authentic love of self. Just as taking mind-alter-
ing drugs that can seriously impair one's mental and emotional
ability to exercise love and charity is against this form of love, so
also is killing oneself.
Aquinas' evaluation of suicide was reaffirmed by numerous
medieval and early modem Catholic moral writers, and even
today it is endorsed by virtually all modem Catholic moralists.
Henry Davis, for example, held that it was never morally permissi-
ble to kill oneself directly, even as a means to a good end.1
Koch-Preuss held that euthanasia (and suicide) were the destruc-
tion of the temple of God, and "a violation of the property rights
of Jesus Christ."14 7 In 1975 Thomas O'Donnell said that
[t]he Catholic Church has consistently taught that suicide
is a totally indefensible and gravely sinful injection of disor-
dered self-reference determination into the providential
plan of God's love. It is seen as the ultimate violation of
the divine prerogative of the Author of life. We might add
that the divinely endowed rights which the Founding
Fathers of American democracy held to be self-evident...
carry with them certain corresponding fundamental
responsibilities. The most profound of these responsibili-
ties is drastically and definitively abandoned in the act of
self-destruction, and, indeed, in this context euthanasia
and suicide are very much of a piece, and present the same
theological distortion of the right order.1 48
145. Aquinas holds that every creature loves itself, and that suicide is
contrary not only to this natural love of self but also to charity and the love a
person is required to show himself or herself. Id. at quest. 64, art. 5.
146. 2 HENRY DAVIS, MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 142 (1956).
147. 2 ANTON KOCH, A HANDBOOK OF MORAL THEOLOGY 76 (1921).
148. THOMAS O'DONNELL, MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY 49-50
(1991).
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The Declaration on Euthanasia, issued by the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1980, brought Catholic teachings
on the morality of suicide to a culmination:
1. No one can make an attempt on the life of an innocent
person without opposing God's love for that person, with-
out violating a fundamental right, and therefore without
committing a crime of the utmost gravity.
2. Everyone has the duty to lead his or her life in accord-
ance with God's plan. That life is entrusted to the individ-
ual as a good that must bear fruit already here on earth,
but that finds its full perfection only in eternal life.
3. Intentionally causing one's own death, or suicide, is
therefore equally as wrong as murder, such an action on
the part of a person is to be considered as a rejection of
God's sovereignty and loving plan. Furthermore, suicide is
also often a refusal of love for self, the denial of the natural
instinct to live, a flight from the duties of justice and char-
ity owed to one's neighbor, to various communities or to
the whole of society - although, as is generally recog-
nized, at times there are psychological factors present that
can diminish responsibility or even completely remove it.
However, one must clearly distinguish suicide from that
sacrifice of one's life whereby for a higher cause, such as
God's glory, the salvation of souls or the service of one's
brethren, a person offers his or her own life or puts it in
danger. (cf. Jn 15:14)149
This passage is representative of contemporary official Catholic
teachings on suicide, and it sums up well the reasons for the
Catholic tradition's rejection of suicide. Some might contend
that Catholic teaching is inconsistent in its rejection of suicide,
but while the issue has been debated at length, traditional Catho-
lic thought on this issue (as we saw in the last two parts) clearly
has strongly opposed it. Catholic opposition to suicide in this
statement is based on its belief that innocent human life is to be
immune to deliberate killing, and hence, it regards suicide as
intrinsically evil. It denies that there are ever adequate reasons
for deliberately destroying an innocent human life, just as there
are never adequate reasons for deliberately raping or torturing
others. In the classical Catholic perspective, actions have an
149. Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on
Euthanasia, in MORAL RESPONSIBILrry IN PROLONGING LIFE DECISION 290, 290-96
(Donald G. McCarthy & Albert S. Moraczewski eds., 1981) [hereinafter
Declaration on Euthanasia].
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intrinsic moral nature, and if an act is immoral it should not be
done in any circumstance.
Official Catholic teachings have held that suicide is intrinsi
cally immoral when considered in and of itself because it involves
a direct attack on innocent human life. Allowing direct and
deliberate killing of the innocent would run counter to virtually
everything in classical western Christian moral tradition which
held that innocent human life should not be deliberately
destroyed in any circumstance. This tradition sought to protect
the innocent by proscribing abortion, infanticide, killing of non-
combatants in war, suicide, killing of hostages, and terrorist kill-
ing; allowing deliberate self-killing would undermine arguments
against all these other forms of killing.
III. THE COLLAPSE OF THE CATHOLIC PROHIBITION OF SUICIDE
The first major breach of the barrier against suicide con-
structed by Latin Christianity was made not by the Reformers, for
they were generally supportive of the ban, but by Renaissance
philosophers.150 The Renaissance shattered the esteem medieval
Christianity gave to the life of poverty, and it initiated the age of
commercialism, which gave more emphasis to the economic
worth of the individual than to other values. The first attack on
the medieval reverence for life came with Pico della Mirandola
(1463-1494) and his Oration on the Dignity of Man, which made
suicide a mark of human dignity.151 This was the era when mel-
ancholy was regarded as the mark of genius and William Shake-
speare (1564-1616), perhaps the most melancholic of all
Renaissance figures, forced classical Stoic views of suicide into an
Elizabethan mold.152 Dramatists after Shakespeare did not make
suicide an obligatory or central part of their productions, even
though Dryden (1631-1700) and Otway (1652-1685) both con-
structed some of their dramas around suicide.
Renaissance thinkers revived many of the old pagan views of
the world and philosophical principles in support of suicide, and
they turned the light of critical reason to Christian teachings on
suicide. John Donne wrote the first principled moral justifica-
tion of suicide in his Biathanatos.153 He did not consider suicide
150. See 2 LECKY, supra note 66, at 57.
151. Pico della Mirandola, De Hominis Dignitate, in Pico DELLA
MIRANDOLA 58-68 (E. Garin, ed., 1942).
152. See generally FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 175-76.
153. SeeJOHN DONNE, BIATHANATOS (Michael Rudick & Margaret Pabst
Battin eds., 1982). For examples of responses to his work, see W. DENNY,
PELICANICIDIUM (1653); JOHN SyM, LIFE'S PRESERVATIVE AGAINST SELF-KILLING
(Michael McDonald ed., 1988).
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rational or good, but only necessary when people found life
intolerable, and he believed sympathy demanded it be allowed in
those instances. Bourgeois suicides for practical reasons
emerged with much greater frequency during the Renaissance,
and Montaigne (1533-1592) illustrated best of all the spirit of
these suicides:
All comes to one period, whether man make an end of
himself, or whether he endure it; whether he run before
his day, or whether he expect it: whence soever it come, it
is even his owne, where ever the thread be broken, it is all
there, it's the end of the web.14
He also cast a more pragmatic and less principled light on death:
Death is a remedy against all evils: it is a most assured
haven, never to be feared, and often to be sought .... The
voluntarist death is the fairest. Life dependeth on the will
of others, death on ours.
1 5 5
Laws against suicide began to relax at the end of the Renais-
sance, and the traditional Latin Christian prohibitions of Chris-
tian burial were relaxed or abolished in many places. 156 Both
Protestant and Catholic rulers continued to oppose suicide dur-
ing this era and call for strong civil penalties for suicide.
Many eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers
demeaned the value of human life in relation to other values in a
way that had not been seen since the Roman Empire. They
developed a tolerance of idealistic suicide, and in the early part
of the century, there was a notable increase in literary and philo-
sophical suicide, as many of the English and French scholars
ended their academic careers by this means. During the eight-
eenth century, suicide for purely economic reasons increased, as
the growth of capitalism forced many people unexpectedly and
undeservedly into poverty.
15 7
Although his essay on suicide was published posthumously,
David Hume (1711-1776) exemplified the spirit of many English
intellectuals of this time claiming that most suicide prohibitions
were ridiculous. He cynically claimed that, viewed cosmically,
the life of an individual was of no more significance than that of
154. 2 THE ESSAYS OF MICHAEL LORD OF MONTAIGNE 25 (John Florio
trans., 1991).
155. Id.
156. 2 LEcKY, supra note 66, at 61. Laws against suicide were still
defended by Hugo Grotius, but Beccaria and Montesquieu began to challenge
them, and no laws against suicide existed in France by the end of the
revolution.
157. See generally FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 237-39.
19951
484 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
an oyster, which made one's suicide insignificant. 5 The obliga-
tions of individuals to society ceased when they no longer derived
benefits from their fulfillment, and suicide was justified when
existence became a burden, for one was not obliged "to prolong
a miserable existence, because of some frivolous advantage which
the public may perhaps receive."159 But in making this claim, he
did not directly deal with assertions that one often had obliga-
tions to one's friends, spouse, or children, for these relationships
were often most effective in deterring one from committing
suicide.
Hume made the mainstay of his argument the claim that sui-
cide was not contrary to nature:
Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the
peculiar province of the Almighty that it were an encroach-
ment on his right, for men to dispose of their own lives; it
would be equally criminal to act for the preservation of life
as for its destruction. If I turn aside a stone which is falling
upon my head, I disturb the course of nature, and I invade
the peculiar province of the Almighty by lengthening out
my life beyond the period which by the general laws of
matter and motion he had assigned it.
A hair, a fly, an insect is able to destroy this mighty being
whose life is of such importance. Is it an absurdity to sup-
pose that human prudence may dispose of what depends
on such insignificant causes? It would be no crime in me
to divert the Nile or the Danube from its course, were I able
to effect such purposes. Where then is the crime in turn-
ing a few ounces of blood from their natural channel?
'Tis impious, says the old Roman superstition, to divert riv-
ers from their course, or invade the prerogatives of nature.
'Tis impious, says the French superstition, to inoculate for
the small pox, or usurp the business of providence, by vol-
untarily producing distempers and maladies. 'Tis impious,
says the modern European superstition, to put a period to
our own life, and thereby rebel against our creator; and
why not impious, say I, to build houses, cultivate the
ground, or sail upon the ocean? In all these actions we
employ our powers of mind and body, to produce some
innovation in the course of our nature; and in none of
158. Hume argued that suicide should be "free from any imputation of
guilt or blame, according to the sentiments of all the ancient philosophers."
ALISDAIR MACINrYRE, HUME'S ETHICAL WRITINGS 301 (1963).
159. Id. at 304.
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them do we any more. They are all of them therefore
equally innocent, or equally criminal.' 6
Notice that he justified suicide by claiming it is not against
nature but he did not confront Augustine's assertion that it was
immoral because it was deliberate taking of innocent human life.
Few proponents of suicide, including Hume, directly confronted
this argument, for the simple reason that assailing it would have
brought down the whole moral edifice that protected the inno-
cent from direct and willful killing. Justifying suicide, not
because nature allowed it, but because it is legitimate to kill the
innocent, would have legitimized all sorts of violence against the
undeserving, and Hume probably knew he could not make a per-
suasive argument for suicide on those grounds.
Under the bludgeoning of rationalism, legal punishments of
suicide quickly began to collapse, and under the influence of the
libertinism, rationalism, and secularism of this era, religious
prohibitions of self-killing were broken. 61 D'Holbach (1723-
1789) challenged the notion that human life had an extraordi-
nary value by claiming that death was the remedy given by nature
to despair. 62 Nature did not object to one ending an unhappy
life, and one's duties to society were based only on the social con-
tract. But if society could not prevent intolerable misery, it
would not be wrong to commit suicide as an act of last resort.
163
Voltaire (1694-1778) approached suicide in a very pragmatic
manner. He rejected any religious or romantic reasons for self-
killing and argued that circumstances should determine when
suicide should be allowed."6 He considered confiscation of the
property of a person who committed suicide mere brigandage,
and he became a symbol of growing popular resentment of puni-
tive measures taken to prevent suicide. 6 ' He defended certain
forms of "rational" suicide, but had no sympathy for the romantic
suicides that were often associated with his cause.
Rousseau (1712-1778) was tolerant of suicide in many differ-
ent situations, and he gave best expression to the idealistic and
160. DAVID HUME, ESSAYS MORAL, POLrrIcAL, AND LITERARY 411-12 (1898).
161. Dueling was quite common during this era, and if the number of
deaths from suicide were comparable to those from duelling, there must have
been a great many suicides.
162. 1 BARON D'HoLBACH, A SYSTEM OF NATURE ch. 14 (Boston, Mendun,
eds., 1869).
163. See generally VIRGIL W. Topmzo, D'HOLBACH'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
ITS BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT (1956).
164. Id. at 273. For a discussion of Voltaire's cynical attitude, see NORMAN
L. TORREY, THE SPIRIT OF VOLTARIE 218-20 (1938).
165. ToPAizo, supra note 163, at 224.
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romantic attitude of the age. The twenty-first letter in his Nou-
velle Heloise argued vigorously for the moral legitimacy of roman-
tic suicide, and he felt that only a madman would endure what
he could escape. 16 6 Montesquieu (1689-1755) also favored sui-
cide when life did not give pleasure, for the prince could not
expect one to remain a subject when he gained no benefit from
servitude.167 Diderot (1713-1784) initially condemned suicide,
but showed sympathy for Donne's Biathanatos and finally agreed
that it should not be considered criminal when the person who
committed suicide was insane. 168
The French Revolution revived virtually all of the forms of
suicide that were found in ancient Greece and Rome: political,
philosophical, military, romantic, analgesic, exhibitionist, and
egotistical suicide to preserve honor. The incidence of suicide
increased markedly as revolutionaries attacked not only the Cath-
olic church and its prohibitions of suicide, but also the secular
laws banning it. This was the era of the guillotine, the first
appearance of national armies, and mass suicides by both aristo-
crats and revolutionaries. With the prevalence of political execu-
tions, civil rebellion, and international warfare, many killed
themselves for a wide variety of reasons. So many aristocrats and
revolutionaries died by their own hand that suicide became com-
monplace and banal, and the only suicides that provoked any
sort of reaction were the patriotic suicides of the Republicans,
which harkened back to the ancient Roman suicides. Petion
committed suicide, as did Roland, Buzot, and Clavie'res, and like
the suicide of DuFrieche-Valez, their deaths caused little commo-
tion. 6 Military suicide also reappeared with the suicide of Gen-
eral Beaurepaire after the battle of Verdun.' 70 Even Napoleon
carried a dose of opium with him and used it on April 12, 1814
after being driven from Paris, even though it was not strong
enough to end his life.1 71
166. JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, NOUVELLE HELOISE 263-65 (1968).
167. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, LE-rREs PERSANES 60-61 (1954); see also
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 159-60 (1900).
168. DENIS DIDEROT, ENCYCLOPEDIE, OEVRES completes 20, 140-50 (Jean
Varloot ed., Hermann 1975).
169. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 243-44; 1 GEORGE LAFEVBRE, THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 176 (Elizabeth M. Evanson, trans., 1962); 2 id. at 70.
170. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 244. His death was met with approval, for
a street was named after him, and he was buried in the Pantheon. His death set
a pattern, for "captains scuttle[d] their ships; and many officers [blew]
themselves up in their last redoubt." Id.
171. PAUL JOHNSON, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN 76 (1991). See alsoJ.
CHRISTOPHER HEROLD, THE AGE OF NAPOLEON 330 (1963).
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In England, late eighteenth-century suicide became an act of
aristocratic boredom and people usually committed suicide for
money rather than love, finding greater shame in impoverish-
ment than was usually the case in the Middle Ages.' 72
In the nineteenth century, more conservative forces
reemerged and sought to curb suicide by legal measures. Strin-
gent measures were enacted in France to stop suicide because of
the excesses of the revolutionaries, and many of the traditional
prohibitions that existed prior to the revolution were restored.
By the middle of the century, legal penalties for suicide,
amended during the revolution,, were reestablished, and the
Church denied Christian burial to those who committed sui-
cide. 73 This succeeded in curbing many suicides, but it also pro-
moted concealment of acts of self-murder.
The Romantic era of suicide began when the English poet
English Thomas Chatterton (1752-1770) killed himself because
he was unable to support himself financially, and his death
became a model for Romantic self-destruction. He was a gifted
poet who was thrust into poverty as a child because of his father's
death. He wrote his own poetry, claiming to have discovered it in
a medieval church and attributing it to a fictitious medieval poet,
Thomas Rowley. Chatterton's reputation spread, and even
though he published widely, he was never given proper recogni-
tion or remuneration for his work. He struggled to avoid finan-
cial ruin, and finally failing, he was driven to madness and he
killed himself. Ensuing generations idolized Chatterton and
transformed his suicide into a martyrdom and model for Roman-
tic suicide, and they regarded him as the epitome of the Roman-
tic genius who was persecuted, misunderstood, impoverished,
and ultimately driven to despair and death because of his gifts.
Chatterton was the new saint-genius of the Romantics, not only
possessing all of the virtues they revered (remarkable insight, cre-
ativity, and imagination), but also suffering all the horrors they
condemned (poverty and persecution by a pedestrian aristocracy
and the bourgeoisie). He was the perfect Romantic poet who
emerged briefly from nowhere to enlighten the darkness of the
world and then disappeared in self-inflicted death. The new
Romantic secular saint-genius was a playwright, actor, poet,
scholar, or artist who was driven by forces and powers not shared
by others. Alone and misunderstood, he suffered poverty, aliena-
tion, and destitution precisely because of his gifts. The Rational-
ists of the previous century had given suicide a moral legitimacy,
172. ALvAREz, supra note 51, at 101.
173. See 2 LECKY, supra note 66, at 62; FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 264.
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but the Romantics saw suicide as a mark of the new secular holi-
ness. The Rationalists were the moral reformers who destroyed
the credibility of the old arguments against suicide, but it was the
Romantics who became the saints and heroes of the new
movement.
To die by one's own hand was the road to fame, and suicides
were reported in newspapers in great detail. Virtually all of the
great Romantic figures ended their writing careers at a young
age, either by suicide or by other equally destructive means.
Byron (1788-1824), Keats (1795-1821), and Shelley (1792-1822)
all died as young men, and even though Coleridge (1772-1834)
lived into his sixties, he committed litterateuricide, admitting that
his latter years were virtually posthumous existence and utterly
unproductive. Gustave Flaubert (1821-1880) claimed that he
dreamed of suicide, and he and his friends
lived in a strange world, I assure you; we swung between
madness and suicide; some of them killed themselves ...
another strangled himself with his tie, several died of
debauchery in order to escape boredom; it was
beautiful. 17
4
There was another side to Romantic suicide that involved
frustrated love, ennui, and the boredom of youth. The Roman-
tics made death infinitely sweeter by glossing over its more hide-
ous aspects, and the worthiest death two lovers could hope for
was to plunge over a cliff arm in arm, which was epitomized in
Indiana by George Sand (1804-1876).? 7 Indiana was a woman
who was ruined by a man for whom she sacrificed everything,
and she was rescued by her devoted cousin Ralph. Sand seems to
have wanted to have the two of them commit suicide together by
throwing themselves from a cliff, but ultimately they did not do
this. For Sand, lovers such as Indiana and Ralph could legiti-
mately commit suicide because of a general malaise from which
they suffered on account of their love and misfortune.
Even though Goethe was skeptical of the whole suicide
craze, his Trials of Young Werther gave a particularly Romantic
tinge to this sort of death.176 Rather than committing suicide
174. CHARLES CARLUT, LA CORRESPONDANCE DE FLAUBERT: ETUDE ET
RtPERTOIRE CRITIQUE 58, 191 (1968). L. S. Shanks, in his biography of young
Flaubert, notes that he was highly neurotic, suffered a nervous breakdown, and
was filled with pessimism in his youth. See generaly LEwis PIAGET SHANKS,
FLAUBERT'S YOUTH (1927). Flaubert defined suicide as "Proof of Cowardice."
GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, DIcrIONARY OF PLATITUDES 135 (1954).
175. GEORGE SAND, INDIANA (1852).
176. JOHANNE WOLFGANG GOETHE, THE TRIALS OF YOUNG WERTHER 23-129
(Hutter ed., Signet Books 1962) (1787).
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because of poverty, boredom, or passionate love, Werther broke
the thread of life because of his failed love for Lotte. 17 7 This
character transformed Chatterton into a Romantic figure who
was driven to suicide, not by poverty and rejection, but by pas-
sion, love, and genius. Suicide, much like Werther's blue coat
and yellow waistcoat, enhanced the personality of the poet, and
Werthers progress was measured in the number of bodies
counted. It is estimated that suicides in France doubled between
1820 and 1840, and this is primarily due to the influences of
these Romantics. 178
Like the Circumcellions of old, the Romantics made suicide
mandatory for secular canonization, and what these people did
in their lives was less important than what they did in their
deaths. The Circumcellions could believe almost anything they
wanted, provided they died by their own hand. The Romantic
poets did not necessarily have to display any artistic gifts or crea-
tivity, provided they posed as geniuses and ended their lives by
suicide. The secularization of society was complete.
Suicide in the post-Romantic era ceased to be the result of
desperate passion, but of boredom. 179 Suicide was no longer
regarded as a sinful or immoral act, and the worst that was said of
it was that it was a betrayal of one's family and caused disgrace. It
soon lost its criminal character as well, and the primary argument
against suicide in this era was that it harmed one's family and
brought shame and malicious gossip.I° Suicide was believed to
run in families, and it could radically impair one's social
standing.
This era marked the end to virtually all prohibitions of
Christian burial, and in England in the 1820s people who com-
mitted suicide were allowed to be buried on consecrated ground,
although this had to be done at night."8 1 By the early 1880s, sui-
cide was removed from the legal category of homicide, and the
penalty for attempted suicide was reduced to two years imprison-
ment, although assisting suicide carried a penalty of life
imprisonment. 182
Some authors at this time rejected the romantic views. The
pessimist philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) initially
177. The Romantics committed suicide in the belief that they would be
present at their final dramatic and artistic act, which shows the schizophrenia
and unreality of the movement.
178. ALVAREz, supra note 51, at 43.
179. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 280.
180. See 1 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 197 (Garland Books, 1975).
181. See FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 261; 2 LECKY, supra note 66, at 62.
182. FEDDEN, supra note 65, at 261-62.
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gave strong support to suicide as a fundamental human right, but
he would only allow it as an expression of human freedom
because it alone definitively overcame the will to live. In the end,
however, he found the desire for death to be merely an expres-
sion of the will to live and became more critical of it.183 Dosto-
yevsky argued vigorously against accepting suicide, and he
believed it was imperative to reject suicide to be able to look
beyond the absurdity of the world to see a coherent cosmology
and anthropology. He was diametrically opposed to the Ratio-
nalists and saw that suicide was not a "part of life" but was its
cessation, and he concluded that the arguments for it were ulti-
mately absurd. To accept the rationality of suicide was to accept
the absurd, and this was a factor in his return to Christianity.
In Dostoyevsky's The Possessed, Kirilov committed what is
called "logical suicide,"1" which Dostoyevsky regarded as nothz
ing but a logical absurdity. He understood that regarding suicide
as rational and logical made our existence absurd and only mar-
ginally above cattle. This was irrational, for it insulted us by
imputing meaninglessness to our lives and it forced him to
believe in God to make sense of our existence. He saw that if
there is no God to condemn suicide, then man is a god, not as
Nietzsche saw Ubermensch, but straight-forwardly and baldly. If
God did not exist, we were divine and we had to kill ourselves to
be the lord of the living and the dead, which in itself is illogical.
Suicide was logical if death was merely tomorrow's zero with
nothing standing beyond it. This is the kernel of the rationalist
argument for suicide, but Dostoyevsky saw this reduction of
death to the final zero point of life -as making life absurd and
illogical. He sided with the rationality and coherence of life and
existence itself and concluded that the argument for suicide,
"logical suicide," is itself illogical. 85 Wittgenstein, like Dostoyev-
sky, understood the absurd logic of suicide quite well:
If suicide is allowed then everything is allowed.
If anything is not allowed then suicide is not allowed.
This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so
to speak, the elementary sin.
And when one investigates it, it is like investigating mer-
cury vapors in order to comprehend the nature of vapors.
Or is even suicide in itself neither good nor evil? 186
183. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, STUDIES IN PESSIMISM 43-50 (1903).
184. AURAHYARMOLINSKY, DoSToYEvsKv WORKS AND DAYS 357-58 (1971).
185. See generally id.
186. LUDWIG Wrr-rGENSTEIN, NOTEBOOKS: 1914-1916 90 (E.N. Anscombe
et al. eds., 1961).
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Dada gave suicide its own peculiar twist. The Romantics
treated life as worthless in the face of passionate love, but the
Dadaist movement saw even this love as worthless. Life was so
trivial and meaningless that Dadaists did not even try to justify
suicide, and even required self-assassination for admission into
the artistic avant-garde. Suicide fit the Dadaist movement well
because it espoused destructive agitation against everything.
Dada ridiculed the absurdity of existence and it believed that sus-
taining this ridicule was more important than art or even exist-
ence itself. Dada bludgeoned existence and asserted the
meaninglessness of its values. Dada was anti-art, anti-everything,
and ultimately anti-itself.
Dada treated life itself as worthless, and it ridiculed it as
much as it did art.187 But Dada did not consider the valueless-
ness and ridiculousness of human existence to be tragic, and it
stripped away the despair surrounding the absurdity of existence
by making a joke of it. The Romantics needed to justify suicide
because of the inability of life to sustain passionate love, but the
Dadaists needed no such reasons, for merely the patent absurdity
and senselessness of life justified suicide. Jacques Vache was the
Dadaist par excellence, and as a cruel joke he ended his life by a
lethal overdose of opium, which he also administered to two of
his friends without their knowledge. Jacques Rigaut was called
an "empty suitcase" by a friend, implying that beneath the shell
of his exterior existence there was nothing but emptiness and
absurdity. Rigaut considered suicide a vocation, and his own sui-
cide ended the Dadaist period. While the Rationalists chal-
lenged the notion that human life must always and everywhere
be protected, the Dadaists regarded life as something so absurd,
farcical, and empty that it was always and everywhere legitimate
to destroy it. While modern suicide advocates consider suicide
eminently rational, Dada saw it as the most absurd and irrational
action possible to express the irrationality and absurdity of
human existence. Post-Enlightenment thought rejected theolog-
ical condemnations of suicide, but Dada made suicide an artistic
and moral value. In many respects Dada was thoroughly mod-
em, for it glorified destructiveness and saw it as the greatest of
human accomplishments. Dadaists made death part of their art,
just as the Romantics did, but their art was to be anti-art and
ultimately anti-everything.
187. See generally ALvAREz, supra note 51, at 224-34.
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IV. THE CONTEMPORARY ASSISTED SUICIDE MOVEMENT AND
CATHOLIC TEACHINGS
To justify its call for endorsement of assisted suicide, the
contemporary assisted suicide movement has adopted many
arguments and claims of earlier suicide advocates. From the
Catholic perspective, few of the arguments and claims the con-
temporary assisted suicide movement now makes are new, as only
those involving issues involving contemporary technology seem
to be in any way novel. The contemporary assisted suicide move-
ment has invoked arguments that were previously made by Stoics,
Epicureans, Rationalists, Romantics and irrationalists, but it also
has proposed justifications that have not been seen before. In
what follows I will show where these arguments can be found in
the contemporary justifications for assisted suicide.
1) Stoicism."8' The Stoic arguments justifying suicide in the
present movement are seen in claims that one should have abso-
lute and unrestricted power to determine one's fate. The Stoics
stressed absolute self-determination in much the same way that
Seneca did when he claimed that life should be ended when it
becomes painful and burdensome. Another facet of Stoic
thought that has been incorporated into the suicide movement is
the view that suicide is utterly rational when mental powers dete-
riorate.'18 9 Contemporary claims that life should be ended when
physical life decays also echo this view. The view proposed by
contemporary advocates of suicide that suicide is "natural" is
reflected in Attalus the Stoic's advice to Marcellinus that death
was nothing and was not to be feared. 9 ° Present-day suicide
advocates claim that life without certain valued qualities is also
without dignity, faintly echoing of Attalus' denials that life itself
had dignity, and suicide was permitted whenever this became
evident. 191
2) Epicureanism. Elements of Epicureanism can be seen in
the current debates that life which has become empty should be
ended. While the Epicureans understood this void primarily in
terms of the finer and higher pleasures, contemporary hedonis-
tic advocates of suicide view this in terms of the pleasures of a
dignified life.' 92 Modem suicide proponents trivialize both the
188. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
189. See Eliot Slater, Choosing the Time to Die, in SUICIDE: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 199 (Margaret Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo eds., 1980).
190. Id. at 204.
191. See Margaret Pabst Battin, Suicide: A Fundamental Human Righ in
SUICIDE: THE PHLOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 189, at 267, 272-77.
192. Id.
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life and death of one whose mental and physical powers have
deteriorated. This trivialization mirrors Epicurean views that life
devoid of certain pleasures is without value.19 Lucretius held
that taking death upon oneself was not a great matter and death
itself was not something to be feared. He declared that it is a
good thing to take a "gentle poison" which brings life to an end
when pleasure is lost. This emphasis on the sweetness and gen-
tleness of death is seen today in both Derek Humphry's modem
manual for suicide, Final Exit, which describes various methods
for bringing death swiftly and painlessly, and in Dr. Jack Kevor-
kian's suicide machine, which is designed to bring death softly,
silently and mechanically.' 94 Epicureans demanded control over
one's life, particularly in times of suffering and pain, and Kevor-
kian and Humphryjustify much of their efforts by claiming that
they enhance control over one's life.19
3) Rationalism. Arguments justifying suicide today employ
many claims made by rationalist suicide advocates such as David
Hume.'" 6 He argued that restrictions on suicide were ridiculous,
and this claim is echoed by Dr. Kevorkian, who claims that any
and all objections to suicide are based on mere superstition, and
asserts that his own arguments are "scientific" and "empirical"
while those of others are based on "taboos".' 9 7 Pro-suicide writ-
ings such as those of Joseph Fletcher also echo Montaigne's
rationalist view that voluntary death is the most rational. These
writings assert that death which comes by natural forces is less
voluntary, less rational, and therefore human.198 Plotinus held
that suicide was impermissible except in the case of "stem neces-
sity", and many contemporary advocates of rational suicide share
in his rationalism and would consider terminal illness, loss of dig-
nity, and imminent death to be such a necessity. Plato believed
suicide acceptable when one was struck with calamity or tragedy,
and most advocates of assisted suicide would agree.
4) Romanticism. Romantic themes are also seen in contem-
porary arguments in favor of assisted suicide, for one can justify
inflicting death on a suffering individual only if death itself is
193. See BETTY ROLLIN, LAST WISH 208-36 (1985).
194. See DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL Exrr: THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-
DELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991). See also Lisa Belkin,
Doctor Tells of First Death Using His Suicide Device N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al,
B6.
195. DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETr, THE RIGHT TO DIE:
UNDERSTANDING EUTHANASIA 229, 313-14 (1986).
196. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
197. Belkin, supra note 194, at Al.
198. JOSEPH FLETCHER, HUMANHOOD: ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 141
(1979).
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romanticized to a certain extent. Few advocates today would pro-
mote suicide for frustrated love, as often done by nineteenth-cen-
tury Romantics. Rather than claiming that suicide was an act of
genius, or an act expressive of the irrationality of existence, as
did the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Romantics,
contemporary Romantics are more restrained. They stress that
suicide is a proper reaction to the cruelty of terminal illness and
untreatable pain. 1" They do not see it as a condemnation of
existence itself. D'Holbach considered death by suicide the
proper cure for despair. This is echoed by contemporary suicide
advocates, who hold that the suffering of ill and dying patients is
too great a burden for existence to sustain, and that therefore
suicide is justifiable. °° This position is similar to statements of
the Romantics, who argued that the suffering of love was too
great for existence to bear. Contemporary suicide advocates do
not claim that their frustrated genius justifies their suicide, but
only that their decisions for death are more enlightened than
those who suffer and wait for death to come naturally.
20 1
5) Irrationalirsm. Ordinarily, the law enters into areas of life
to give it an order and regulation that coordinates action and
makes it more efficient and productive. 0 2 Usually, this is not
resisted, but is welcomed because the order and regulation
granted by the law brings prosperity, protection, and harmony.
But suicide advocates are divided as to whether this should be
accepted or not.2 3 There are elements of irrationalism in the
contemporary suicide movement. These elements are seen in
the aversion of some segments of the movement to any controls,
regulations, or norms without respect to the beneficial conse-
quences that might come from them. Some assisted suicide pro-
ponents argue vigorously against any involvement by the state,
family, or community, even though these individuals and groups
might have valid and legitimate interests in being involved in the
decision.2 4 There is a strain of irrationalism in this approach
because it places undue and unjustifiable hope in the power of
pure and contentless autonomy to bring fulfillment and happi-
ness. It fails to see that depriving the law of any power to control
199. See Richard B. Brandt, The Rationality of Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 189, at 117, 123.
200. SeeJoSEPH MARGOLIS, NEGATIvrrEs: THE LIMrrs OF LIFE 23-36 (1975).
See also supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
201. See FLETCHER, supra note 198, at 141-43.
202. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 267-70 (1980).
203. BA-IN, supra note 12, at 75-113.
204. Thomas S. Szasz, The Ethics of Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL
ISSUES, supra note 189, at 185, 191-97.
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this sort of action could doom any program because of the harm
that could come upon unsuspecting individuals.
The irrationalism and despair of Dada were certainly radical,
and there is little trace of this radicalism in the contemporary
suicide movement. But some of its less extreme elements can be
found in the doctrines of the contemporary assisted suicide
movement. The despair of the Dadaists is faintly reflected in
those suicide advocates today who spurn all attempts by pastors,
psychiatrists, and social workers to bring aid, comfort, and conso-
lation to those contemplating self-execution.20 They are ada-
mant in their claims that these efforts to bring hope, aid, and
comfort to the suffering are futile and probably even insulting.
In previous generations, their efforts were seen as noble and vir-
tuous, but many contemporary proponents see them as fruitless
and an unjustifiable interference in the privacy of suicidal indi-
viduals. Their implicit belief seems to be that little or nothing
can be done in situations of great suffering or distress.
In spite of the fact that there are historical precedents for
the contemporary assisted suicide movement, there are features
in the present movement to legalize suicide that are historically
unique. For the sort of suicide most seek today is what I call
"analgesic-technological" suicide, and this is new in some
respects. In the past 75 years, technology, medicine, and science
have all combined to vastly increase our powers to sustain human
life. Consequently, some suicide advocates want legal and social
endorsement of suicide to liberate the dying from unrelenting
and inescapable pain or profound physical debilitation resulting
from the application of "ordinary life-saving treatments." Some
people fear the possibility of being trapped in these conditions
by modern technology, and they would not consider a swift and
painless suicide an extreme response to their plight. It is not
merely the physical pain and imminence of death that prompts
them to call for swift and painless death, but also the loss of dig-
nity they feel in these circumstances. Life in this condition, no
matter how long it might endure, compromises or destroys their
dignity, advocates argue. Many suicide proponents believe that
deliverance from this through suicide is justified and
proportionate.
V. THE CATHOLIC PROHIBITION OF ASSISTED SUICIDE TODAY
Just as the contemporary assisted suicide movement has
incorporated elements of earlier thought into its arguments on
205. Id. at 193-95. Thomas Szasz objects vigorously to professional
interventions to stop suicide attempts.
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behalf of the morality and rationality of suicide, so also has the
contemporary Catholic position adopted some arguments from
the past in its dispute with suicide advocates. Just as suicide advo-
cates have selectively suppressed certain arguments, so also has
the Catholic Church in the contemporary suicide debate. The
Catholic argument against suicide that has survived with the
greatest force from the past has been Augustine's argument that
killing the innocent is never morally permissible. This argument
located the malice of suicide in the direct intention against the
life of an innocent human being, and it remains the cornerstone
of contemporary Catholic arguments against suicide. Aquinas'
claim that suicide was against virtue or charity has been trans-
formed into an assertion that it is the ultimate act of selfishness.
His assertion that suicide was contrary to the justice owed to God
has been changed into an argument that suicide is a violation of
the rights of others who have an interest in the life of the suicidal
person. Aquinas' view that suicide was contrary to prudence has
been transformed in the contemporary controversy into an argu-
ment that in a suicidal act, one refuses to acknowledge that the
individual, bound in unity with others in charity, can work
through virtually all problems and difficulties. His view that self-
assassination is contrary to the virtue of hope has been retained
in contemporary Catholic teachings in support of contemporary
suicidology which regards suicide as the ultimate act of despair.
However, his claims that suicide was contrary to other virtues
such as fortitude have fallen by the wayside and do not have
much prominence in the current debate.
Arguments that are relatively new have also emerged in con-
temporary Catholic thought. The first of these holds that suicide
violates not so much the dignity of human life as its sanctity. This
new perspective owes a great deal to the classical imago Dei doc-
trine, for the sanctity of human life is grounded on this theologi-
cal doctrine. Because of the imago Dei, genuine sanctity resides in
human existence. As such, a sacred zone surrounding human
life had to be recognized that forbade deliberate killing of the
innocent. This argument has proven to be quite persuasive in
the twentieth century on account of the profound disrespect and
even scorn or hatred shown toward human life in this astonish-
ingly murderous century.
The second new element in Catholic teachings against sui-
cide asserts that self-killing should not be approved because it is
not a genuinely rational action as it is driven by the dark psycho-
logical forces of passion, guilt, fear, revenge, self-hatred, and
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despair which overwhelm the judgment of reason.2 °6 More than
claiming, as Aquinas did, that suicide is an act contrary to the
virtues and implicitly an act resulting from a gross character
defect Catholic arguments against suicide now stress that it is a
capitulation to these dark and eminently irrational forces and
should not be regarded as rational. The twentieth century is
remarkable for its advances in understanding human psychology.
Far better than any previous century, we understand the irra-
tional forces that often drive our actions and how we need to
master these forces to achieve psychological wholeness. The
Catholic argument that suicide is irrational because it flows from
these destructive and irrational forces is quite powerful in a cen-
tury which has awakened to the power of subconscious forces in
our actions. Catholic teachings have shown a greater openness
to these sorts of theoretical advances of suicidology than have
suicide advocates, and this has strengthened Catholicism's argu-
ments against suicide.
In comparison to arguments on behalf of the morality of sui-
cide, contemporary Catholic arguments have been much more
open to modem developments in philosophy, psychology, theol-
ogy and morality than have those of suicide advocates. And in
response to the horrors of twentieth-century warfare, genocide in
its various contemporary forms, and international abortion and
contraception, Catholic teachings have vigorously affirmed the
transcendence of human life,2 ° 7 while suicide advocates have
continued to ascribe only a limited and utilitarian value to it.
Catholic teachings on the morality of suicide have argued might-
ily against twentieth-century devaluations of the value of life by
vigorously and repeatedly affirming its sanctity while suicide
advocates have continued to insist on only a limited and fragile
valuation of human life.
The contemporary Catholic arguments against suicide have
also shown a remarkable responsiveness to modem trends and
developments. In the high middle ages, the Catholic Church
granted the speculative and theoretical permissibility that capital
punishment could be justly and fairly imposed. It simply
declared that the state had the moral right to visit a sentence of
death on some individuals for certain capital crimes. 20 8 But this
teaching has been substantially qualified in this century because
it has become more and more clear that this sentence could not
206. See ROBERT L. BARRY, BREAKING THE THREAD OF LIFE: ON RATIONAL
SUICIDE 201-10 (1994).
207. See Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 149, at 290-91.
208. 2 EBERHARD WELTY, A HANDBOOK OF CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS 277
(1963).
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be imposed in most circumstances without bias."°9 A similar ver-
dict has been made of the insight that suicide too is uncontrolla-
ble, and unlike suicide advocates, Catholic teachings now hold
that liberal suicide laws cannot control suicide in practice and
protect the innocent from it. This was the hard lesson not yet
fully learned from the Romantics, Dadaists, Nazis, and contem-
porary Dutch, who attempted to institute suicide programs that
degenerated into uncontrollable suicide epidemics."' And just
as many now protest capital punishment because it cannot be
administered with adequate protection for the innocent or with
sufficient controls against bias, so also suicide programs cannot
be instituted with sufficient controls or protection for the inno-
cent. This has been ignored by contemporary suicide advocates,
who claim that their proposals contain measures to control sui-
cidal practices and protect the innocent.
Contemporary Catholic teachings also confront the claim
made that advances in technology have made legal and social
endorsement of suicide a necessity. Catholic teachings concern-
ing the administration of analgesia hold that it is morally legiti-
mate for health care providers to offer adequate analgesia to
patients in deep and unremitting pain, even if this would shorten
their lives."' And Catholic teachings hold that life-sustaining
measures that are radically painful or burdensome, exceptionally
expensive, or clinically ineffective need not be accepted by a
patient.21 2 Rather than making suicide more necessary now than
in previous decades, advances in therapy, health care, pastoral
care, and analgesia have abolished many of the justifications sui-
cide advocates invoke to warrant self-killing. Pieter Admiraal, a
leading contemporary suicide proponent in Holland, admits that
pain is not a sufficient reason for choosing suicide any more. 1
The only reason that suicide advocates can now invoke to justify
suicide is loss of dignity, but Catholic theology counters this by
arguing that a dignity and value exists in all forms of human
existence, even human suffering.
The Catholic arguments against assisted suicide actually
have a great deal of support at the present time, even though
209. U.S. Catholic Bishops, Statement on Capital Punishment, 10 OIGINS
373, 376 (1980).
210. For a discussion of the Dutch experience, see CARLOS F. GOMEZ,
REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS (1991).
211. See Robert Barry & James E. Maher, Indirectly Intended Life-Shortening
Analgesia: Clarifying the Principles, 6 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 117, 117-51 (1990).
212. Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 149, at 294-95.
213. He made this point in a debate with me on Nightline (ABC television
broadcast, Feb. 3, 1987).
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many opinion polls do not clearly reflect this. Most contempo-
rary polls concerning assisted suicide ask whether a person who is
suffering and terminally ill should be able to end their life to
preserve his or her dignity or escape pain and suffering, and a
large portion, but not a majority, of the population supports
this.2 4 There is abundant support among the disabled for meas-
ures to prohibit suicide.2"'
There is, however, little support for the view that suicide
should be permitted for the irrational persons. 16 This is an
important finding, for the opinion of psychiatrists and medical
professionals is that there are very few, if any suicides, that can be
truly called rational.217 The general public, however, has increas-
ingly come to believe that the suicides of gravely or terminally ill
persons are not irrational, but are intelligent and free choices
that are different from other suicides. Experts in treating the
suicidal deny this, and see all of the elements of irrational sui-
cides in those who are terminally ill and gravely suffering.2"'
Greater support for the Catholic prohibition of assisted sui-
cide could develop if it was more clearly seen that such a prohibi-
tion aims at protecting the vulnerable from doing harm to
themselves. The Catholic prohibition of suicide was directed at
protecting the weak, vulnerable, and despairing from doing
harm to themselves, for suicide is not the choice of the happy,
healthy, prosperous, and successful. 9 Suicide is the great temp-
214. The November 5, 1994 referendum endorsing assisted suicide in
Oregon passed only with the slimmest of margins. This cannot be used to
argue that a majority of opinion is in favor of assisted suicide because Oregon is
one of the most liberal and secularized states in the nation.
215. See Carol J. Gill, Suicide Intervention for People with Disabilities: A Lesson
in Inequality, 8 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 37, 37 n.1 (1992); Paul S. Miller, The Impact of
Assisted Suicide on Persons With Disabilities-Is It a Right Without Freedom,? 9 IssuEs
IN L. & MED. 47, 47 n.1 (1993). See also Background: Quotes and Comments on
Assisted Suicide, 3 LIFE AT RISK no. 4 (1993) (quoting Bill Bolte, President of
Barrier Busters, criticizing measures endorsing assisted suicide because of their
impact on the disabled).
216. See Jerome A. Motto, The Right to Suicide: A Psychiatrist's View, in
SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 189, at 212, 215-16; Erwin
Ringel, Suicide Prevention and the Value of Human Life in SUICIDE: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 189, at 205.
217. See BARRY, supra note 206, at 201-10. Robert E. Litman, Suicide as
Acting Out, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUICIDE, 293, 297-99 (Edwin S. Shneidman et
al. eds., 1970).
218. See also DAVID J. MAYO, "Contemporay Philosophical Literature on Suicide:
A Review" in SUICIDE AND ETHICS 318, 340 (David Mayo ed., 1983); David J.
Mayo, Irrational Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 189,
at 138; George E. Murphy, Suicide and the Right to Die, 130 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 472,
472 n.4 (1973).
219. See BARRY, supra note 206, at 291-98.
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tation of those whose lives are not going well, or who are sick,
destitute, defeated, shamed, lonely, or despairing. The Catholic
prohibition aims at protecting them from doing even greater
harm to themselves.The existence of strong support for the Catholic prohibition
can be seen most forcefully in the fact that American communi-
ties of law and medicine have not spoken out in its favor. 2 °
Assisting in suicide is still a criminal action in half of the states in
the U.S. and it is by no means clear that many physicians have
assisted in suicides in recent years. 221 The German medical pro-
fession suffered extraordinary moral opprobrium for their toler-
ance and cooperation with the German euthanasia and suicide
movement. One of the purposes of the Catholic prohibition of
suicide is to protect the medical profession of this generation
from suffering the same opprobrium in future decades.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Catholic teachings on suicide have a certain authority
simply because of their antiquity, but one has to wonder if they
have been rendered obsolete and if it is not time to consider
them relics of a bygone age. There is still substantial support for
the Catholic prohibition of suicide, but even if there was not, the
Catholic prohibition of suicide would remain the same. This is
because sooner or later, the American assisted suicide movement
will degenerate into one allowing the unconsented killing of the
incompetent as did the Nazi and now the Dutch movements.
When this happens, the Catholic Church does not want to be
defending those who will be doing this, but rather wants to be on
220. See Nancy W. Dickey, Euthanasia: A Concept Whose Time has Come?, 8
ISSUES IN L. & MED. 521, 521 n.4 (1993). The Oregon initiative passed by a very
narrow margin, and a judge has blocked its implementation pending a
challenge of the initiative's constitutionality. Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 149
(D. Ore. 1994). The strength of Catholic opposition to assisted suicide is seen
in the fact that the American Medical Association joined with the Oregon
Catholic Conference to oppose the Oregon measure. See AMA Re'ects Assisted
Suicide, 3 LIFE AT RISK no. 10, at 2 (1993); Medical Groups Slam Oregon's Measure
16, 4 LIFE AT RISK no. 8, at 2 (1994); Oregon Debate Shifts Into High Gear, 4 LIFE AT
RISK no. 7, at 1 (1994). This is significant because the American Medical
Association has regularly and consistently opposed most of the judgments made
by the Catholic bishops on bioethical issues in recent decades, but its house of
delegates voted against it.
221. Besides Dr. Kevorkian, only Dr. Timothy Quill has publicly admitted
to having assisted in a suicide. See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity - A Case
of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED, 691, 691 n.10 (1991).
The only other publicly admitted case was that involving the killing of a patient
by an anonymous physician. See It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
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the side of people who see it as sentimental homicide. We
should not think that the Dutch or Nazis were terribly different
from our contemporary suicide advocates, for part of their prop-
aganda was the call to allow self-killing as a means to avoid
profound and intractable pain and suffering. In their misguided
attempts to do this, their movement was driven by the logic of its
principles to permit deliberate and unconsented killing of the
incompetent.222
222. See generally C. Ann Potter, Will the "Right to Die" Become a License to
Kill? The Growth of Euthanasia in America, 19J. LEGIS. 31 (1993); Leo Alexander,
M.D., Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENG. J. MD. 39-47 (1949),
reprinted in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 571, 584 (DennisJ. Horan et al. eds.,
1977).
1995]

